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ABSTRACT
The exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis have failed
to provide a serious analysis of the political, economic and ideological trends of the period.

They were wrong in their predictions

that Marxism and radical ideologies would lose their power to motivate.

They were also wrong in their predictions that the two great

ideological systems were converging.

Not only did they fail to

provide an analysis of the political, economic, and ideological trends
of the period, but they also failed to provide a serious analysis
of ideology as a concept.
In an attempt to define ideology, I trace its appearance and
usage in early, philosophical writings to such modern interpretations
of the word as seen in the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries philosophers ,: Marx, Mannheim, and Lukacs. A definition is presented •
"Ideology is any more or less systematic set of ideas and thoughts
which have been converted into beliefs explaining man's attitudes
towards life and his existence in society and specifying a pattern of
political action responsive to, and commensurate with, such ideas and
thoughts."
Another reason why attention is focused on the interpretation
of ideology as presented by the above theorists is to demonstrate the
validity of four propositions:

First, ideology was part of a philos-

ophical conception of politics critical of all pre-modern conceptions
of the political arrangements under which society was organized and not
any justification of the existing order of things. Second, all later
ideologies are attempts to resolve the basic theoretical and practical
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problems posed by the original theory of ideology.

Third, the

contemporary ideological climate of thought is mainly the result
of the vulgarization of the concept by Marxist theorists who attempted
to provide an analysis of ideology.

Fourth, the views held by the

exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis are similar to those who
have provided the basic ideas for the formulation of the concept.
The entire convergence thesis is based on the static assumption about the momentary state of world politics and economics, and
the thesis tends to disregard more fundamental differences among
social institutions and attitudes. There is a conceptual confusion
which tends to obscure the many-sided reality of the contemporary world.
The convergence theory should be dismissed because it does not provide
any evidence that ideologies are declining.

It simply lends justifi-

cation to the accusation that the exponents of the decline thesis do
not write as social scientists but as ideologues.
Ideology has been seen as declining as a result of the
emergence of a post-industrial society in which scientific knowledge
and technology play a central role. This society is also characterized
by high and widespread levels of economic well-being and affluence
which lead to the disappearance of dissatisfaction.

In short, all the

dimensions of the post-industrial society are non-political.

But

these writers have not elaborated the political implications of"their
concept. No systematic attention has been given to the nature of the
post-industrial society.
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Implicit in the writings of the exponents of the decline
thesis is the assumption that there is an ultimate movement towards
a static equilibrium of the social forces and a denial of moral and
human ideals in the post-industrial society.

But they have mis-

construed what happens to man's political interests, behavior and
attitudes towards politics as society becomes more affluent.

Several

plausible hypotheses are examined with respect to the attitudinal
change that may occur in the post-industrial and affluent society.
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INTRODUCTION

The decade between 1950 and 1960 is characterized by
certain features which mistakenly were interpreted as a moderation
of ideological conflict. Many political scientists hastened to
hail the arrival of what they thought was an era of non-ideological
politics.

Non-ideological politics, they believed, resulted from

the arrival of the mixed economy guided by what was alleged to be
Keynesian theory. They believed that Social Democracy was eroding
the foundations of both Marxism and capitalism.

The politics of

Social Democracy took on a messianic value because, it was believed,
it would cure the evils of pure capitalism and marxist practice and
theory.

Just as in past apocalyptic and messianic periods, it was

proclaimed that nothing but the sober truth was being told. This
led many to proclaim the "end of ideology" thesis which was first
advanced by Edward Shi Is at the Congress of Cultural Freedom which
met in 1954 and later was endorsed and developed by Daniel Bell and
Seymour Martin Lipset. The central message in this thesis was that
ideology was at an end because fundamental social conflict was at an
end.

The advocates of this thesis maintained that there were no

longer any social roots for politics which proposed a revolutionary
transformation of the social order. Bell asserted that critics who
had articulated the revolutionary impulses of the past had abandoned
the chiliastic hopes, millenarianism and apocalyptic thinking which
signified the end of ideology.
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The advocates of the thesis of the decline of ideology argued
that after World War II there was little concern with the conflicting
political ideologies that had guided the masses and parties of the
past.

Societies, it was further argued, were overcoming the tensions

and contradictions that had threatened the stability of the past.
Societies were adapting rapidly by their high standards

of living,

full employment, and by means of economic expansion to social problems
that had beset them in the past. Societies, including the Soviet
Union, appeared to be following a pattern of stabilization. The
political scientists who took up this approach were less interested in
knowing the mechanisms of social change than they were in discovering
the mechanisms of social equilibrium that would ensure continued
stability. Thus their conception of society was not dynamic:

it was

functional and integrative.
In the third chapter of this paper I will consider the debate
of those who maintained that politics is a matter of pragmatic compromise within an agreed framework of basic values, a framework which
depends upon a consensus which has arrived by means of the institutions
of the Welfare State and the economic and political domestication of
the working class.

In support of their thesis they have argued that

the rival and competing interests which had been allowed expression
within the official political order would no longer breed disruptive
conflict. They also asserted that the presentation of ideological
world views which might guide and inform politics of passionate conflict
would henceforth be out of place in the advanced industrial society.
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This industrial society would be capable of absorbing disruptive
conflict by its capacity to satisfy basic needs. But the issue has
been misconstrued in several ways and these writers failed to diagnose
correctly the nature of that to which they were sensitive. A consensus and low political participation in active politics promotes
democratic and peaceful political and social processes while conflict and widespread participation tends to go hand in hand with
totalitarianism and authoritarianism and therefore in both cases it is
meaningful to speak of ideological politics. Liberalism in the
United States, in its effort to promote its values, has succeeded to
a large extent to create a consensus by adopting certain policies
which are advocated by its rivals.
Science and technology which, according to these theorists,
will free decision-making from distortions and which will insulate
politics from the influence of ideology, are likely to be influenced
by ideological convictions and be limited or inhibited by the dominance
of particular ideologies. Also, once man is liberated from the
economic and, in general, the material needs he will be preoccupied
with the fulfilment of spiritual aspirations.

In short, the advanced

industrial society is likely to generate tensions and contradictions
which will threaten any stability that we might have enjoyed in the
past or may be enjoying at the present.
The writers of the decline-of-ideology thesis also appear to
have confused the e<haustion of ideology with the exhaustion of Marxism,
radicalism and, in general, revolutionary politics. At times it appears
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that the end-of-ideology thesis, far from proving that ideologies
have ended, is itself an expression of the ideology of the time and
place where it arose. One is reminded of the claims of classical
Marxism.

It was Marx who argued that the social roots of ideological

thinking will be destroyed, that ideology will wither away with the
arrival of communism.

Similar assertions are found in the convergence

theory which holds that a coming together of liberalism and Marxism
eventually will lead to the emergence of the politics of social
democracy.
To support the thesis that the end-of-ideology thesis is
itself part of an ideology, and thus is self-refuting, we must
examine what Bell, Lipset, Shils and others understand by the expression
"ideology".

In chapter two I will be discussing these points at

greater length.
In the first chapter I will discuss the concept of ideology,
dealing mainly with those writers who have seen ideology as being the
reflection of base and super-structure of the society. To substantiate
the thesis that the end of ideology hypothesis is itself ideological
it is important to look at the concept of ideology as it was viewed
by Marxists. Despite some differing views that we find among these
theorists, their conceptions of ideology bear striking similarities.
Equally important, we find a striking resemblance between those'who
formulated the concept and most of the writers who have argued that
ideologies have declined. According to those theorists whose conception of ideology will be discussed, the chief forces which determine
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the features of society and shape the thought and ideas of men is
the mode of production. The mode of production of material life
conditions the social, political and intellectual process in general.
The production of material wealth dominates the production of ideas.
When the base (the mode of production) changes there is a change in
social views.

Ideological activity is directed by the super-

structure, the institutions of society.

Consequently, as the causes

which give rise to class differences are abandoned, as society moves
toward socialism, as capitalism is undermined, man's ideas become
less and less distorted.

Man acquires gradually knowledge of the

historical laws which he applies to social relations.
The manner in which most of the exponents of the decline-ofideology thesis treat the subject suggests that ideologies disappear
with the creation of certain social and political institutions and
norms.

For these exponents, ideology comes to an end with the arrival

of the mixed economy guided by socialist principles, in other words,
with the arrival of the politics of Social Democracy. Whether distortions of reality, which supposedly are caused by ideologies, disappear with the emergence of the communist society or the emergence of
Social Democratic society is not important. What is important is that
as a certain type of society emerges, people dispense with illusions.
The similarities become apparent when we look at the definitions of those who have provided the principal ideas for the development
of the concept. As will be seen, according to those theorists ideologies are for the most part post facto justifications or rationalizations
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for the existing organization of society.

Most of the exponents

of the decline-of-ideology thesis hold similar views.

For the

leader of these exponents, Daniel Bell, ideology is an illusion.
Ideologies, he asserts, are organized systems of belief with ready
formulae for the manipulation of the masses. The manner in which
Bell defines ideology, of course, can cover all ideologies, not just
the "bourgeois" ideology.

However, the elements of falsity, ration-

alization, distortion, and justification are the fundamental components according to many contemporary political scientists.
Ideology is seen as that set of ideas with which a society justifies
and mythologizes itself. Talcott Parsons is closer to the Marxist
view than anyone else.

For him, ideology is the deviation from

scientific objectivity.
As stated previously, the equating of ideological theorizing
with totalitarian and revolutionary politics is a central theme in
most of the writers who deal with the decline of ideology and I will
devote considerable attention to this theme. The viewing of ideology
as revolutionary has given rise to the claim that the age of ideology
has ended in a static, affluent social equilibrium and that this
equilibrium and stability can be perpetuated by means of identifying
the mechanisms of accommodation and equilibration.

Such an analysis

of the situation is faulty as I shall demonstrate by identifying" the
sources which act as agents of social change and which exert pressure
on society to move forward rather than remain static.

I will also

try to identify the causes that bring changes in the political attitudes
and behavior of individuals and groups and thus upset any equilibrium
that might have existed.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE DEFINITION OF IDEOLOGY

When it comes to the definition of ideology there is so much
variation that the term almost loses its meaning. There are those
who hold the view that ideologies obtain, or aspire to obtain, their
effects entirely through distortion and illusions, and a few who
employ the term in a more neutral fashion.

If we accept temporarily

that ideologies are systems of partially oriented beliefs and attitudes associated with social groups, then it is clear that the
theoretical interest in the concept of ideology has not arisen only
in modern times.

In fact, interest in this area is older than the

emergence of the term ideology itself. Bacon's criticism of the "idola",
idols or preconceptions that deceive men and constitute obstacles in
the path of true knowledge, is the earliest theoretical concern with
the concept. Bacon regarded "idola" as being mainly the consequence of
man's psychological constitution but he also attributed them to social
factors J
This line of thought has remained almost unbroken in the
European intellectual tradition starting with Bacon and continuing to
the modern concept of ideology. The term, however, first appeared in

1. The Physical and Metaphysical Works of Bacon.
Joseph Devey, Bell & Sons, London, 1891, p. 392.

Edited by
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the seventeenth century and during the eighteenth century the writers
of the French Enlightenment contributed a great deal to the discussion
of ideology.

Ideology became the central concern of the philosophers

although the term was not yet used widely.

The philosophers were

disturbed by the way in which nations, in fact, entire historical
epochs, could be circumscribed by systems of beliefs, how belief
systems prevented nations and entire populations from breaking the state
of ignorance in which they were kept. Yet the term was destined to
be associated with that mentality of thinking which is characterized
by irrationality and has little appreciation for thought as an
instrument for grasping reality.

Not only were the philosophers

disturbed but they were also fascinated and this aroused their interest
in the study of belief systems. The philosophers believed that the
root of all civil discord was the prejudicial quality of man's ideas
about the nature and objects of political life.
The question they wanted to answer, then, was how these prejudices could be eradicated and replaced with scientific and universally
acknowledged ideas?

The answer would be provided by a new education

which would be based on the science of ideas which they called ideologic.
During the period of the French Revolution, Europe was enmeshed in illusory traditions that were distilled and promoted b'y what
the philosophers believed to be despots, the priest caste, and for
purposes of keeping the masses in a state of ignorance.

It was during

this period that many devices were designed to break the grip of the
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familiar, to destroy the spell of prejudice, and, in general, to
emancipate the masses from the force of habit and custom.

Those who

undertook this task were men like Descartes with his methodology of
doubt which was directed primarily against the prevailing conceptions
of reason and all claims that were made uncritically in its name,
Rousseau with his ideas about the state of nature, and Montesquieu
who introduced the inductive and historical approach to the study of
politics and destroyed many traditional arguments used in justification
of many prevailing conditions.
We may say that although these men became interested in the
study of belief systems, in reality they were becoming ideologues
themselves.

It is no wonder, then, that when ideology first made its

appearance, its reputation was different from that of today.
When De Tracy coined the word ideology he wanted to transform
the mundane into knowledge. The use of ideology was the particular
method that he proposed as universally applicable.

Ideology was the

science of ideas which was to provide the true foundation for all
other sciences.

It enabled thinkers to investigate and describe the

manner in which human thoughts are constituted.

De Tracy defined the

science of ideas as follows:
The science may be called ideology, if
one considers only the subject-matter;
general grammar, if one considers only
the method; and logic, only if one considers the purpose. Whatever the name,
it necessarily contains those three
subdivisions since one cannot be treated
adequately without also treating the
other two. Ideology seems to be the
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generic term because the science of
ideas subsumes both that of their
expression and that of their derivation^
Thus ideology began its career as an attempt to dispel illusions, to
break the grip of illusions and the spell of prejudice.

Ideology

emerged as a reaction to the world in all realms of experience and
gave a new impetus to the historical perspective. The ideologues felt
that intellectual and political authorities were so strongly attached
to prejudices that they were unable to understand reality.

Ideo-

logical analysis was used to unmask preconceived notions and challenge
established assumptions.
them critically.

It aspired to judge opinions and examine

Even ideologies which appeared later were used to

unmask the supposed hidden motives of their adversaries.

But, of

course, this was not the exclusive privilege of a certain group of
thinkers or political men. Nothing could prevent the opponents of any
group from availing themselves of the weapon and applying it to their
opponents.

Ideology acquired a pejorative connotation, the connotation

that has been assigned to it by most writers, when the liberals, the
philosophical group in France who sought to base the cultural sciences
on anthropological and psychological foundations and the Institute
they had formed,faded away. Napoleon labelled as ideologues all#those

2. In Karl Mannheim. Ideology and Utopia. New York:
Kegan Paul Ltd., 1932, Translated by Edward Shils.

Routledge &
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philosophers who stood in the way of his centralizing policies.
"Thereby the word took on a derogatory meaning which, like the word
'doctrinaire1, it has retained to the present day."3
contrast with all that is supposed to be realistic.

It is used in
Its more en-

compassing sense, to characterize the belief systems of social groups,
dates back to the early writings of Marx. Marx wanted to trace
"bourgeois" thought to ideological foundations and thereby to discredit
it. Of course the first one to notice that social groups carry with
them systems of outlook was Hegel. These systems of outlook were
often more implicit than explicit. They were systems which limited
conceptual horizons and influenced the answers men find as well as
the very questions they tend to ask.

However, it was through Marx

who attached the word "ideology" to social belief systems that the concept became more generally understood.

Ideology has been given different

interpretations. One is that ideology is a reflection of the economic
infra-structure.Marx states:
The production of ideas, of conceptions
of consciousness is at first directly
interwoven with the material activity
and the material intercourse of men, the
language of real life, Conceiving,
thinking, the mental intercourse of men
appears at this stage as the direct
afflux of their material behavior. The

3.

Karl Mannheim.

Ideology and Utopia, op. cit., p. 72.
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same applies to mental production as
expressed in the language of politics,
laws, morality, religion, metaphysics
of the people. Men are the producers
of their conceptions, ideas, etc.-real,
active men as they are conditioned by a
definite development of the productive
forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its further forms.^

Ideology has been seen as a false consciousness which is the
totally distorted mind and everything that comes within its range.
Thus the "end of ideology", as Engels used the phrase, meant the time
when men would achieve "true" consciousness, or the awareness of the
direction of history and the material basis of society.
can serve only as a masquerade.

But ideology

It is associated with illusions,

dogmatic dreamings, and distortions of men.

Ideology serves to mask

from men the real nature of their condition as historical actors.
According to Marx, however, ideology can not be expected to
serve as an illusion for ever and to conceal the condition of man.
The ruling class in the capitalist system would not be able to deceive
men for ever.

The systematic contradictions within the capitalist system

would slowly awaken the working class from the "nightmare" of the past.
Workers would begin the revolution by experiencing their
grievances separately, each worker within the confines of his individual
life.

The factory system would provide a communal context for these

grievances.

Slowly the workers would become enlightened, connecting

4. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. The German Ideology.
Foreign Language Publishing House, 1947, p. 274.

Moscow:
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personal grievances with group grievances, group grievances with
social concerns, and social concerns with a scientific knowledge of
social change. At each step, the workers would gain subtlety in their
appreciation of the connection between their personal conditions,
the conditions of their fellows and the nature of the system in
which they played a part. Their grievances would eventually acquire
a dynamic quality, leading them on in a problem-solving manner into
social struggle and organization building. The working class would
become the agency of its own liberation because ordinary men would
acquire a sense for reality, a clear-sighted and determined appreciation of the "true conditions for working-class emancipation". The
workers have remained unaffected by ideologies.
Ideology, according to Marx, expresses the interests of a
definite class and the fundamental features of all the forms of the
social consciousness of this class. The ideology of the working
class is Marxism, but this ideology refers to a harmonious scientific
system of views expressing the fundamental interests of the proletariat
and revealing the law-governed character of the social development that
inevitably leads to communism.

Once the workers are in power they

will continue to exhibit the problem-solving scientific orientation
they developed in the struggle. They are men who can dispense with
illusions because they are dealing with the real problems of life from
a historical perspective and not from an ideological perspective.
While Marx asserted that his set of ideas was a science and not
an ideology, Lenin reluctantly admitted that Marxism was itself an
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ideology.

He used the term ideology to mean the combat of ideas.

In the hands of the people ideology becomes a means of revealing
the opinion of the people and of training the masses in the spirit
of the high ideals of industriousness, equality, fraternity, internationalism, peace, revolutionary irreconcilability towards tyranny
and oppression.

Public opinion is a powerful educational weapon of

people who are imbued with the moral qualities laid down in the ethical
code of the builders of communism.

Ideology is also necessary in

organizing the masses to liberate themselves from the fetters of
capital ism.5

Not only is Lenin responsible for casting Marxist ideas

into the role of ideology but also for giving Marxism its totalistic
framework and made these ideas synonymous with total belief.

Lenin

had argued that "since there can be no talk of an independent ideology
being developed by the masses of the workers themselves in the process
of their movement, the only choice is:
socialist ideology."6

either the bourgeois or the

Nevertheless he insisted that Marxism is guided

by science and he maintained that Marxism was replacing politics by a
strikingly integral and harmonious scientific theory which would emancipate the world from spiritual enslavement.

People would be equipped

with a scientific method of cognition which they would apply in
explaining social life.

5.

V. I. Lenin.

Collected Works, Vol. 5, p. 375.

6. Daniel Bell. "Ideology and Soviet Politics".
XXIV, No. 4,(December 1965), p..593.

Slavic Review.

- 15 -

Other writers have depicted ideology as a deformed and inverted
reflection of the real.

They have conceived of ideology as being an

illusion that ignores its own material foundations.

This, of course,

leads to a very restricted definition of ideology.

The boundaries of

ideology are constituted by what it is not:
ness".

knowledge, "true conscious-

This position was adopted by Lukacs in his History and Class

Consciousness.

Lukacs has defined ideology as a "false consciousness".

The element of falsity derives from the partiality of ideology.

Ideo-

logy is unable to seize the "total meaning" of society and history.
He contrasts ideology with "true consciousness".
true consciousness is the proletariat.

The bearer of this

Only the proletariat has the

ability to escape ideology and know the whole truth.7

It is the pre-

rogative of the militant proletariat to use ideological analysis to
unmask the hidden motives of its adversaries.

Unfortunately, however,

this potential capacity to transcend "false consciousness", or ideology,
is not actualized in proletarians as such, but only in party intellectuals such as Lukacs.

As he has admitted, one must never ignore the

distance which separates the level of consciousness of even the most
revolutionary workers, and the true class consciousness of the proletariat.8

Here Lukacs implicitly identifies himself as one of the

bearers of "true class consciousness of the proletariat" and a member
of that group which has access to the truth.

7. George Lukacs. History and Class Consciousness. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1968. Translated by R. Livington, p. 71.
8.

Ibid,, p. "75.
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The proletariat, according to Lukacs, possesses the knowledge of the total socio-economic process. The imminent victory of
the proletariat will supposedly abolish all particular standpoints.
Lukacs' position here contrasts with Lenin's espousal of science, for
to identify "false consciousness" with all partial or restricted outlooks is to cast doubt on the specialization that any science necessarily
implies.

Scientific information can only be disseminated by the upper

classes who are not part of the proletariat and, secondly, it can only
confuse the proletariat whose role it is to create the Marxist
revolution.
Marcuse joins forces with Lukacs and criticizes the application of science in freeing men from the "fetters" of ideology.
According to Marcuse, science cannot function as the basis of a critique
of the prevailing state of affairs. The form and content of scientific
concepts remain bound up with the prevailing order of things; they are
static in character.9

Philosophical cognition is superior to experience

and science. The rationality of science, instead of being used for the
attainment of a rational order of life, creates those conditions which
mask irrationality.

He states:

The p r i n c i p l e s of modern science were a
p r i o r i structured i n such a way t h a t they could
serve as conceptual instruments f o r a universe
of s e l f - p r o p e l l i n g , productive c o n t r o l ;

9. Herbert Marcuse. Reason and Revolution. Boston:
1960, p. 157.

Beacon Press
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theoretical operational ism. The
scientific method which led to the
ever-more-effective domination of
nature thus came to provide the
pure concepts as well as the
instrumentalities for the evermore-effective domination of man by
man through the domination of nature J O

The interpretation of ideology as a mere reflection of the
economic infrastructure was accepted also by Bernstein.

Ideology,

according to Bernstein, is reduced to an epiphenomenon, a mechanical
reflection of the movement of the economic base. He accepts the
Marxist thesis that the method of production of the material things
of life settles generally the social, political, and spiritual process of life.n

Although Bernstein believed that man had a moral will

which enabled him to ease class antagonisms, which is a non-deterministic view, he believed that ideology obediently follows the fatalistic unfolding of history without itself possessing any force.
Ideologies, for Bernstein, neither implied social progress nor did
they contribute to the maintenance of social stagnation.

Development

is accomplished without or against the will of man.
Marxists do not have the intellectual monopoly over the term
"ideology".

10.

Ideology has been associated with the sociology of know-

Herbert Marcuse.

11. Eduard Bernstein.
Books, 1970, p. 7.
12.

Ibid,., p. 15.

Reason and Revolution, op. cit., p. 185.
Evolutionary Socialism.

New York:

Schocken
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ledge and has received close attention from Karl Mannheim.

Mannheim

labelled as ideology the conservative, interest-based and biased ideas
of the dominant class in society.

It is a self-serving set of ideas

designed to promote the interests of the advantaged.13

This -js the

particular ideology which is a reflection of the special interests of
competitive groups in society.

From this particular ideology develops

a total ideology or sociology of knowledge, "an all inclusive principle
according to which the thought of e^ery group is seen arising out of
its life condition".'4

There will be a time when society would be

ruled by an intellectual elite trained in the sociology of knowledge
which would be capable of transcending the bias of particular ideologies.
This elite is a "socially unattached intelligentsia" which operates
critically because it is not firmly situated in the social order J 5

in

a way Mannheim adopts Lukacs1 concept of the proletariat as being
capable of knowing the truth thus leading the discussion of ideology
back to de Tracy's original concept. The main goal of the sociology of
knowledge is to show objectively how the social setting decisively
controls the content and purpose of thinking, to unmask and lay bare the
unconscious sources of intellectual existence and the unconscious motives
that lead men to adopt particular viewpoints. According to Mannheim,
modes of thought cannot be properly understood outside of their social

13. Karl Mannheim. Ideology and Utopia.
and World, Inc., 1968, p. 49.
14. Ibid., pp. 55-56.
15. Ibid.', p. 137.

New York:

Harcourt, Brace
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context.

"The powers of perception of the different perspectives

are conditioned by the social situations in which they arose and to
which they are relevant."^

Thought is conditioned by the life

situation of the thinker and his group. The individual becomes bound
into a system of relationships, which hamper his will and rest upon his
uncontrolled decisions.

He becomes free to choose only when he is

made aware of the motives hidden behind his decisions. The task of
discovering these motives belongs to those intellectuals who are
trained in the sociology of knowledge.
When sciences, such as mathematics and physics, reach certain
conclusions, these conclusions have validity only for the groups of
people who are similary situated, who see things from the same perspective.
The individualistic assumption of classical epistemology receives a
harsh criticism from Mannheim.

He maintains that the perspective from

which men's ideas are formed is the product of social circumstance.
Social circumstances form men's ideas and not the reverse.
view of Mannheim creates a serious problem:

But this

what is the status of

this sociological theory that claims all such theory is relative?
difficulty has come to be known as Mannheim's paradox.

This

Mannheim here

attempts to save his theory by insisting that just because a mode of
thought is socially determined, it is not to be discarded and condemned
as false. This provides Mannheim with some flexibility but his theory
must be elaborated further. Thus, like Lukacs, he attempts to locate

16.

Karl Mannheim.

Ideology and Utopia, op. cit., p. 255.
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a particular social group that is prone to the truth because of its
life style. For Lukacs, as we have seen, such a group was the proletariat.

For Mannheim it is the intellegentsia. As we saw, this

social group has the ability and hence the chance to perceive the
truth because it is "unattached" and is best suited to rise above the
distorted perceptions and see the reality.
Mannheim's paradox, however, remains unresolved. The
unresolved paradox renders his descriptions and theories immune to
empirical evaluation. Since his hypotheses are untestable in principle,
they are useless for scientific analysis and research. But even if
we did not insist on strict adherence to scientific methods, we
could still argue that it is yery debatable whether any social group
is free of partiality and unattached.

Even here Mannheim is not con-

sistent though he strives for clarity of definition as he distinguishes
between two uses of the term.

He calls them the particular conception

of ideology and the total conception of ideology. The particular conception of ideology reflects the special interests of eclectic, competitive groups in a society, and a structure of values that expresses
the felt needs of the groups. Thus, in the particular conception,
ideology is used simply as a negative evaluation. An opponent's arguments are dismissed as lies and deceptions. The particular conception
of ideology remains on the psychological level. With the total conception of ideology Mannheim becomes concerned with world outlooks,
with the belief systems of an age of of an historical, social group.
Unfortunately it is not always clear whether Mannheim is using the term
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in its particular or total application.

He states that the "particular

conception of ideology signifies a phenomenon intermediate between a
simple lie at one pole, and an error, which is the result of distorted
and faulty conceptual apparatus, at the other.

It refers to the sphere

of errors, psychological in nature, which, unlike deliberate deceptions,
are not intentional, but follow inevitably and unwittingly from certain
determinants."17

The total conception of ideology is obtained when

men surrender the static conception of consciousness.

Now "the growing

body of material discovered by historical research does not remain an
incoherent and discontinuous mass of discrete events. This conception
of consciousness provides a more adequate perspective for the comprehension of historical rea1ity."18

More importantly,

Mannheim is

capable of using the term in senses that are not exactly reducible to
either the particular or total conceptions.

For example, at times

ideology means conservative as contrasted with Utopian thinking.^
Mannheim's theory of total ideology suffers from many deficiencies
as a tool of analysis. His theory is so sweeping and so radically
relativistic that, despite his efforts to find a way out, 20

he is un-

able to do justice to the multitude of economic, social, and psychological forces that mediate between society and its values and modes of
knowledge.

17.

Karl Mannheim.

18.

Ibid., p. 63.

19.

Ibid., p. 102.

Ideology and Utopia, op. cit., p. 61.

20. Robert K. Merton. Social Theory and Social Structure.
New York: The Free Press, 1968
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Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia has failed to inaugurate a
series of theories.

It has been followed by the deterioration of

analysis of ideology and by a tendency of writers in this area to
pursue divergent courses.
In modern American theory, the term ideology has normally been
associated with consciously formulated, political outlooks. Within
this general perspective there has also been a great variation in the
definition of the concept. Shils associates ideology with rapid,
fanatical, closed systems which are typified by communism and fascism.
For Shils, ideology is the "creation of charismatic persons who
possess powerful, expensive, and simplified visions of the world."21
Ideologies are always opposed to the status quo, even where their
advocates happen to be in power. The New Left in America depicts
ideology as the cunning construct of the big conglomerates and their
political lieutenants.
According to Daniel Bell, ideologies are forms of legitimation.
Society has to justify itself in one way or another to its members. It
has to establish some justification of the coercion;

it has to trans-

form power into legitimacy in order to govern without turning an entire
society into a concentration camp.22

if 0 ne of the functions of ideo-

logies were this, the leaders of the Soviet Union and other societies
would not have to resort to brute force to remain in power.
Bell further asserts that ideology is an instrument for
rationalization.

It also serves as a mechanism for the internalization

21. Edward Shils. "Ideology & Civility: On the Politics of the
Intellectuals." Sewanee Review. LXCI (July-September 1958), p. 450.
22. Daniel Bell. "Ideology and Soviet Politics." Slavic Review
XXIV, No. 4 (December 1965), p.. 593. "".
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of values, beliefs and purposes.

"Within eyery operative society

there must be some creed, a set of beliefs and values, traditions and
purposes which links both the institutional networks and the emotional
affinities of the members into some transcendental whole and there have
to be some mechanisms whereby those values cannot only be internalized
by individuals...but also made explicit for the society...."23

if

ideologies performed such functions, ideally, each member of the Soviet
society would subscribe to this belief system and would have internalized the goals and values that derive from communist ideology.

Each

person would have accepted the decisions of the party and the role of
the communist party in society, and would display an eagerness to
become a highly productive member of society.

Yet this is not the case.

In his study of ideology and totalitarianism Brzezinski uses
the following as a working definition of ideology:
It is essentially an action programme suitable
for mass consumption, derived from certain
doctrinal assumptions about the general nature
of the dynamics of social reality, and combining
some assertions about the inadequacies of the
past and/or present with some explicit guides
to action for improving the situation and some
notions of the desired eventual state of affairs.
Ideology thus combines political action with a
consciousness both of purpose and of the general
thrust of hi story.24

23. Daniel Bell.
pp. 591 - 603.

Ideology and Soviet Politics, op. cit.,

24. Zbigniew Brzezinski.
Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics.
New York: Praeger, 1967 , p. 5.
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While these formulations are generally sophisticated, they reflect
some of the conceptual confusion in the study of ideology and underplay the crucial role of theories of reality and the interplay of
such theories with social structures and value systems.
Geertz has argued for a more neutral conception of ideology,
neutral as to its particular, political complection as well as to its
veracity.

According to Geertz, ideology can be seen as one of the

forms of cultural patterns which provide practical orientations and
enable individuals to give some coherence to their social circumstances.

Ideologies tend to be schematic.

However, because they

perform a practical function, the schematization does not necessarily
lead to distortion.

Thus the defining characteristic of ideology is

function and not distortion.^
Another definition according to which ideology is seen in a
neutral manner and one which gives ideology great scope and utility
is provided by Macpherson.

He says:

I use ideology in a neutral sense, neither
implying, with Marx, an idealistic philosophy and "false consciousness", nor with
Mannheim, contrasting ideology and 'utopia1.
I take ideology to be any more or less
systematic set of ideas about man's place in
nature, in society, and in history (i.e. in
relation to particular societies), which can
elicit the commitment of significant numbers
of people to (or against) political change.
This does not exclude a set of ideas
essentially concerned with merely a class or

25. Clifford Geertz. "Ideology as a Cultural System," in
Ideology and Discontent. Ed. by David Apter, New York: The
Free Press, 1964 , pp . 47-76.
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nations, if it relates the place and needs
of that section of humanity to the place of
man in general
Ideologies contain in
varying proportions, elements of explanation
(of fact and of history), justification (of
demands), and faith and belief (in the
ultimate truth or rightness of their case).
They are informed by, but are less precise
and systematic than, political theories or
political philosophies.26

Ideologies, according to the above quotation, not only do not have
sweeping visions but also seek to answer the questions regarded as
important for the society to which they appeal, the society which
they must seek to transform or maintain.

Moreover, Macpherson suggests,

they do not make universal statements about human life but are kept
fairly close within the bounds of human possibilities.
Furthermore, we should realize that an ideology is not to be
taken to mean irrationality or intellectual dishonesty.

As has been

pointed out, "we have to face the fact that ideas, whether they may at
times serve as part of myths, are independently subject to the standard
of truth."27

The major function of ideology is to produce fusion of

thought and action, not to infuse ideas with passion which blinds men
from understanding their own limitations.

Ideology does not attempt to

hinder the rational abilities of man but it attempts to place passion
under the control of reason, to apply intelligence, the fusion of passion

26. C. B. Macpherson.
1973, pp. 157-158.

Democratic Theory.

Oxford:

Clarendon Press,

27. Carl J. Friedrich. "Political Philosophy," in Approaches to the
Study of Politics. Ed. by R. Young, Northwestern University Press,
p. 186.
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and critical reason, to the problems of the modern world. We have to
make a distinction also between ideology defined as a system of ideas
concerning the existing social order

together with actions to be

taken regarding it, and a revolutionary or totalitarian ideology defined
as the total rejection of the existing society and programmes of total
reconstruction. As Aiken remarks, "the general idea that concerns us is
not...the identification of ideology with revolutionary activity,
especially of the more bizarre and feckless sort,"28

an

ideology which

in its vision of the future cannot distinguish possibilities from
probabilities, but the issues over which men in societies will continue
to quarrel.
I propose to define ideology as any more or less systematic
set of ideas and thoughts which have been converted into beliefs
explaining man's attitudes towards life and his existence in society
and specifying a pattern of political action responsive to, and commensurate with, such ideas and thoughts. Political ideologies are mainly
concerned with the distribution of political power; they are concerned
with the more equitable distribution of resources among the various
classes constituting the society.
FUNCTIONS OF IDEOLOGY
Ideologies are employed to facilitate or even achieve the
transitoriness from those arrangements in which unthinking acceptance of
poverty, prejudice, superstition, unquestioning submission to authority,

28. David Aiken.
p; 38. - " :. '

"The Revolt Against Ideology."

Commentary 37 (April 1964),
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irrational in themselves, are permanent features of society.29
An ideology is a uniting and persuasive force.

It functions

as integrating values around which individuals or societies become
organized and exist as coherent entities.
An ideology is an activating instrument.
to put ideas into application.

It enables people

Ideas require the persuasive qualities

of ideologies; otherwise ideas would remain meaningless abstractions.
Ideology is the major dynamic force in history.

For a dynamic factor,

however, to have historical significance it must meet certain prerequisites.

Only rational ideas can have historic effects and only to

the extent to which they correspond to the empirical trends of events.
More precisely, the role of ideology is to give the forces of history
rational, communicable form so that they may become effective and not
to be dissipated in a series of short-lived explosions. The condition
for the permanent effectiveness of an ideology is the validity of the
ideas.

To be valid, an ideology must read correctly its social and

natural environment, must be cognizant of its direction, and must be
applied in action.
forces.

Its aims and goals are to conquer the irrational

Another requirement for its success is to reformulate its aims

with each passing wind. An ideology restrains, stimulates and guides
action by its intellectual force and it carries ideas beyond the age
and the social circles in which it expressed a living experience.
An ideology operates in a dialectical manner, as a process
in which contrary and defective truths are harmonized.

The synthesis

29. George Lichtheim. The Concept of Ideology and Other Essays.
New York: Vintage Books, 1967, p. 45.
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of thesis and antithesis results in a more complete truth. Societies
reach a point where the prevailing outlook and ideas are inadequate
to explain things and to justify the condition of people or guide their
conduct and thus the prevailing outlook has become unacceptable.
Ideologies, then, will seek to redefine man's perspective regarding the
place of man in society.
Ideologies in the past were the conspicuous vehicles for
change.

As Hoffer remarks, "Islam,when it emerged,was an organizing

and modernizing medium.

Christianity was a civilizing and modernizing

influence among the savage tribes of Europe. The Crusaders and the
Reformation both were crucial factors in shaking the Western world from
Of)

the stagnation of the Middle Ages."°

Again the phenomenal moderniz-

ation of Japan "would probably not have been possible without the
revivalist spirit of Japanese national ism."31

Lenin and the Bolsheviks

plunged recklessly into chaos in their attempt to create a new world
because they had a blind faith in the omnipotence of Marxist doctrine.
If hope and faith are not backed by reason, the ideology will generate
the most reckless daring.

This type of ideology has a millenial component.

CONCLUSION
Ideology, at least in its philosophical sense, appeared as a
radicalization of the early modern critique of medieval philosophy,
natural and political.

It was an attempt to reconstitute the sciences

on the basis of a new theoretical understanding of the human mind.

30. Eric Hoffer. The True Believer. New York:
Publishers, 1951, p. 4.
31.

Ibid., p. 5.

Harper & Row,

Soon
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it became more concerned with social and political criticism.

How-

ever, as soon as ideology made its appearance, a strong reaction,
political in nature, occurred.

Subsequent ideologies came to consider

every opposing or any previous "ideologies" (or opposing "scientific"
facts) as false "ideologies". Gradually it came to be regarded as
empirical sociology or a science by those who criticized other ideas.
This empirical sociology in turn was called an ideology by its
opponents.

Marxism, like all "scientific" theories designed for social

action, is itself an ideology par excellence. The problem with Marxism
is that it makes absolute claims and pretends to know the ultimate truth.
But the charge of being ideological is not a label of which the Marxists
could retain possession; it is being used against all and sundry, including
the followers of Marx themselves.
The treatment of ideology by the exponents of the decline-ofideology thesis has a number of striking parallels with the treatment
Marx has provided.

One of these parallels is that they regard Marxism

as the prime example of ideology just as Marx regarded capitalism.
The term ideology has come to mean something shady, a kind of
falsity. Also the manner in which the term has been used suggests that
each historical stage has less falsity.

But only the last historical stage

which, for Lukacs and Marx is the arrival of communism, is free of
ideologies.

When we reach a particular historical stage or some particular

political arrangements, we transcend ideology.

Ideology ceases to per-

form its function, which is the unmasking of its opponents' lies, since
the reasons for its existence have disappeared.

Here we find another
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important parallel. According to the exponents of the decline of
ideology, we reach the point where ideologies serve no purpose when
the politics of Social Democracy have triumphed.

Thus, instead of

providing a conceptual analysis of ideology, the exponents of the
decline thesis cast themselves into the role of the ideologue. This
contention will be elaborated later.
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THE DECLINE OF IDEOLOGY:
ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

The decline of ideology has been assigned several meanings.
Each of the authors who has taken the position that ideologies have
ended has seen the disappearance of certain characteristics of ideology as constituting evidence that ideology itself is declining or
has declined.

They have argued that radical ideologies have lost

their relevance.

Some see the coalescence of certain issues of

traditionally antagonistic ideologies as constituting evidence that
ideologies are losing their power to motivate.
Aron has emphasized that the passing of fanaticism in
political belief has eroded ideologies that were at one time sharp,
distinct and explicit J

He asserts that ideological controversy is

dying down because divergent demands today can be reconciled.2
The impetus to the decline of ideology thesis was provided by
the Milan conference on "The Future of Freedom", sponsored by the
Congress of Cultural Freedom in September, 1955. The intellectuals who
attended the conference reached a consensus along the following lines:
rhetoric has been replaced by reason and ideologies have lost their
religious fervour; total or extremist ideologies have disappeared;
passion has replaced practical analysis; objective criteria in the

1. Raymond Aron. The Opium of the Intellectuals. New York:
W. W. Norton & Co., 1962.
2. Raymond Aron.
1955), p., 32.

"Nations and Ideologies." Encounter*. IV:. 1 (January
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evaluation of goals and aims have replaced distortion; and Bolshevism
and other fanatical movements have disappeared.

They argued that

radical movements of the past have ceased to exist in the West and
that perverted Marxism, which has provided the basis for certain ideological movements, has been abandoned.

The important factor in the

decline of ideology for these intellectuals is the abandonment of
revolutionary alternative.

J)V^
&/

Adjustments or reforms, the adherence to

democratic values, conservatism and liberalism entered into the discussion only peripherally.
It is therefore pertinent to ask whether these writers may not
have confused the presumed demise of Marxist ideology with the demise
of ideology as a whole. To ask this question suggests that we ought
to inquire into what they meant by ideology and the end of ideology.
Certainly the exhaustion of Marxism and Marxist ideas cannot substantiate
the decline-of-ideology thesis. As long as there is commitment to
democratic values, commitment to conservatism, liberalism or socialist
ideas or other ideologies, it is meaningless to speak of the end of
ideology.
For Seymour Lipset, liberal and socialist politics can no longer
serve as the arena for serious criticism from the left. The critical
works of intellectuals, he claims, are sociological rather than politi3
cal.
Ideological politics can only exist in the underdeveloped countries
where the leader must find a scapegoat to blame for the ills of the
society if he is not to lose his hold on the masses "who need the hope

3. Seymour M. Lipset. Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics.
New York: Doubleday, 1960, p. 407.
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implicit in revolutionary chiliastic doctrine-a hope the Communists
are ready to supply."4

He admits, then, that ideological politics

are characterized by the attribution of absolute value to any programme, means of action, by a tendency to act radically without regard
to circumstances.
Daniel Bell claims that ideologies are exhausted because
ideologies have lost their truth and their power to persuade.

He states:

Few serious minds believe any longer that
one can set down 'blueprints' and through
'social engineering' bring about a new
Utopia of social harmony. At the same
time, the older 'counterbeliefs' have lost
their intellectual force as well. Few
'classic' liberals insist that the State
should play no role in the economy, and
few serious conservatives...believe that the
Welfare State is the road to serfdom. In
the Western world, therefore, there is today
a rough consensus among intellectuals on
political issues: the acceptance of the
Welfare State: the desirability of decentralized power; a system of mixed
economy and of political pluralism. In
that sense, too, the ideological age has
ended.5
But let us examine the argument that ideology has declined.
Bell define the liberal and the conservative?

How does

Classic liberalism and

conservatism hardly met all the requirements of the definition of
ideology.

4.

Secondly, non-ideological politics, according to Bell, exist

Ibid., p. 415.

5. Daniel Bell. "The End of Ideology." in Power, Participation and
Ideology. Ed. by C. J. Larsen and P. C. Wasburn, New York: David McKay
Co., 1964, p. 455.
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within the framework of a political society that has rejected,
intellectually speaking, the old apocalyptic and chiliastic visions.
Thirdly, ideological belief is the commitment to the "isms" of
traditional thought which fails to take into consideration the
evolution these "isms" have undergone. Thus he concludes that if a
society is not committed to these traditional ideas, issues cannot be
formulated any more in ideological terms. Or, to put it in different
terms, issues are not seen through ideological prisms. This, however,
should be dismissed as unacceptable.

Fourth, Bell underestimates the

strength of classical liberalism and conservatism in the United States.
If Bell had gone to the trouble to look a little further, he would have
recognized the simple fact that the American Constitution is a conservative document very fearful of surrendering traditionalist parochial
values rather than ensuring progressive values. He would have seen
also that socialism is strongly opposed by both liberals and conservatives because it is seen as a serious threat to their interests. This
is attested by the fact that the social measures which have been instituted by the government do not constitute any comprehensive social
policy.

He would have seen that communism appears as an evil to the

Americans because it remains an expanding totalitarian imperialism.
Bell goes on to say that if the end of ideology has any meaning,
it is to ask for the end of rhetoric and rhetoricians.6

6.

Daniel Bell.

The End of Ideology,

op. cit., p. 462.

However, the
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use of such arguments to support the claim that ideologies have ended
is naive when there are people who are making serious indictments concerning the stupidity, brutality, and inhumanity of the affluent classes
and the influence they exert on governments.

It is meaningless to

speak of the end of debate and rhetoric when there is a demeaning world
the affluent classes have forced upon the poor amid hollow proclamations
of a just society. Those who take such a position ignore the fact that
there are serious criticisms and questioning by the public and intellectuals which makes Bell's argument that rhetoric has ended and therefore
ideology has ended a naive claim.

Such an argument would imply:

a conception of human relations which
would deprive us of the right to address
one another except for the purpose of
comparing notes about matters of fact.
Consider what would happen were such
fantasy to come true. In any ordinary
sense, it would mean a virtual end to
discourse, to communication, and to
argument
Indeed, the image of man
implicit in Bell's dream of the end of
ideology is precisely one of academic
grind or functionary to which he himself,
as a counter-ideologist and counterrhetorician is unfortunately unable to
conform.7
Perhaps we do not have to reach the point where we address each
other for the purpose of comparing notes about matters of fact in order
for us to claim that ideologies have ended, but we do at least require
the existence of a society in which social problems have been solved to

7. David Aitken. "The Revolt Against Ideology."
(April- 1964), p." 43.

Commentary, 37:4
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the general satisfaction, moral issues do not exist and a consensus
has been reached on the goals to be pursued.

However, the fact remains

that politics is still \/ery much concerned with the justification of
political action and organization because of strong criticism.

There

are issues that trouble the public and we live in societies which
require an image of a world better than the one in which we live, a
world which will be better not by material abundance, but by an improvement of the quality of life, by being more just, free and equal.
Apparently Bell believes that the end of rhetoric and rhetoricians
has come about because, as he believes, the debate between left and
right is dead.8

In other words, according to Bell, left and right

reflect the scale by which we evaluate debate and rhetoric and therefore ideological thinking.

Here it is also assumed that political

direction by which we attempt to solve social problems is ordered along
the left-right continuum and since, according to Bell, the ideological
positions of the left and right are converging, ideological thinking
declines.
Another inference that is contained in what Bell says is that
socialism is replacing the "inadequacies" of the capitalist system,
that socialism will bring a more equitable distribution of goods, and
under it everything will be established on the basis of reflection and
rational reconstruction and decisions will be subject to scientific

8.

Daniel Bell.

The End of Ideology, op. cit., p. 460.
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criteria. Twentieth century history compels us to ask whether the
socialist system is capable of removing injustices and the causes of
conflict, and whether it will be able to replace the "irrationalities"
of the capitalist system.

The record of socialism deserves just as

careful a scrutiny as does capitalism.

What Bell says sounds like a

reassertion of the Utopian vision of the heavenly kingdom on earth.
Bell is engaged in the most profound ideological thinking.
Another argument that Daniel Bell advances in support of his
claim that ideologies have ended is that the left is no longer preoccupied with the attainment of the Utopian society.

It has abandoned

its rigid dogmatism and is more interested in progressive reforms.
However, the left covers a myriad of overlapping forms of socialism and
it all depends on which of the main varieties of socialism we speak.
Marxism-Leninism still remains a secular religion, preaching the necessity
of class warfare, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the concentration of all power in a tightly structured party that is supposedly the
vanguard of the revolutionary masses.

It is dogmatic in its determina-

tion to abolish private property and nationalize the means of production,
it has an ultimate goal-the classless society-and today it has no fewer
adherents than it ever had before. Social Democracy is the most liberal
version of socialism.

It has accepted a multiparty political system and

believes in gradual peaceful means of reaching its socialist goals. It
has been more concerned with alleviating what it regards as hardships
created by capitalist economies than with directly restructuring societies
according to a blueprint and its tenets are the same as they were a century

- 38 -

ago.

It is highly critical of Marxism and has attacked the theory

of economic determinism, arguing that ideas and values are independent
of economic conditions, and are themselves important causal agencies in
determining

economic evolution.

Secondly, ideologies do not have to be rigid. They may well
have an elastic quality to cover very different social groups, to unite
them within a common terminology.

For any ideology to survive, it must

be sufficiently flexible to allow this kind of multiple interpretation
otherwise it will be simply an historic occurrence.
short-lived phenomenon.

It will be a

Ideologies must allow for adaptability to new

circumstances. They must be prepared to abandon old notions and accept
new ones and must not claim to supply all the answers to all questions.
An ideology must not claim to have the exclusive solution of man's
socio-political problems or to refuse to admit the validity of other
competitive ideological solutions. Thus, if the left has modified its
position, it is coming closer to meeting the criteria of an ideology,
rather than disappearing as an ideology.

THE CONVERGENCE THEORY AND THE THESIS THAT THE
END-OF-IDEOLOGY THESIS IS ITSELF AN IDEOLOGY
At this point we come to the question whether the end-ofideology thesis is itself part of an ideology which makes the phenomenon
self-refuting.

The ideological character of the thesis is clearly

apparent in Lipset's, Bell's and Mannheim's arguments. The key notions
which carry ideological weight are those of the convergence of the two
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great ideological systems, as already has been seen.

It is this

convergence which leads to the emergence of a new social order:
Social Democracy.

Most of these writers appear to hail the arrival

of the mixed economy allegedly guided by Keynesian theories. Whether
Keynesian theories are themselves true is \/ery debatable.

Some of

the writers seem to attach to Social Democracy a messianic value.
Social Democracy will cure the evils of society and will remove the
cause of conflict and inequalities.

Bell is quite clear as an advo-

cate of Social Democracy and he believes in the "necessity of constant,
incessant pressure from the left upon the establishment and the status
quo in order to rectify grave social wrongs:

injustices, inequalities

and other miseries that are removable through collective social action.""
In any case the convergence of the two economic systems, it is assumed,
leads to the convergence of the two ideologies which leads to a lessening
of conflict and consequently to the decline of ideology.
The first writer to predict the arrival of Social Democracy
was Keynes. He believed that the arrival of Social Democracy was inevitable and that social justice could be promoted through Social
Democratic institutions.

Keynes believed that "the battle of Socialism

against unlimited private profit is being won in detail hour by hour."10

9. Daniel Bell. "Ideology-A Debate."
p. 72. ' ' " • -

Commentary, 38:4 {October 1964),

10. M. John Keynes. The End of Laissez-faire. Dubuque, Iowa:
W. C. Brown, 1926. p. 14.
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Economic progress could be achieved through collective action and
consequently through collective politics.

Experience, he argued,

shows that individuals, when they make up a social unity, are always
less clear-sighted than when they act collectively.

Therefore,

several economic matters should not be left to the chances of private
judgment and private profits.
The debate on whether or not the socio-economic systems of
the East and the West are becoming more similar and may gradually converge was quite vivid during the sixties.

Especially was this true of

those in the West who were impressed by the apparent drive for greater
decentralization in the Soviet Union.

The decline of ideology resulting

from this convergence has been seen from different angles by the
various participants in the debate, especially by Mannheim.
For Mannheim, it appeared that the sober truth was at last
being told because of fundamental changes in the superstructure and the
base.

As we have seen, Karl Mannheim defines ideology as beliefs which

express the interests of a particular social group and as such it only
provides a partial and distorted view of reality.

However, he claims,

there is the individual intellectual who is committed to the ideal of
objective, disinterested, undistorted and independent knowledge.
Mannheim sees the superstructure as being undermined.
juridical,

The political,

religious and moral views, of which the superstructure con-

sists, are reflecting less and less the "distorted" ideas of the

11.

Ibid., p. 15.
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bourgeoise system due to a change in the base: the mode of production.
Thus, Mannheim sees the emergence of a group of intellectuals which is
developing an objective and unbiased knowledge of man's social condition,
one that rises above the distorted perspectives of the masses. This
group of intellectuals is employed by private and public bureaucracies.
These men are given freedom of thought and inquiry.
Aside from his definition of ideology which should be dismissed
as inaccurate, this concept suffers from some serious weaknesses. Why
will these men not become the intellectual spokesmen for vested interests?
Private bureaucracies represent vested interests and unless these
intellectuals reflect the ideas and support the interests of these
bureaucracies they will not be employed by them.

Even if they do not

reflect their ideas at first, eventually they will be transformed into
administrators and will be subordinated to the bureaucracies that employ
them.

Even if they are employed by public bureaucracies, will they be

allowed to follow the kind of direction they want?
There is another implicit assumption here. Since Mannheim considers as "emancipated" intellectuals those who come from the ranks of
the left, it follows that the political myths of the left are gaining
appeal, which, of course, is taking place at the expense of the right.
Therefore, we cannot speak of converging ideological positions, as many
theorists have argued, but of diminishing and increasing appeals. If
this is the case, ideological positions will be hardened because the
side that loses will perceive the other as a threat, thus dividing society
into hostile and competing classes.
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If there is a depoliticization of intellectuals, which is
necessary if they are to rise above ideologies, it would be precisely
the result of indoctrination and intensified manipulation by a group
of ideologically sophisticated but cynical professional persuadersthe kind of ideologists Daniel Bell has described.
One cannot escape the temptation to argue that Mannheim is
here echoing the thoughts of Compte, who believed that politics would
become a sort of applied social physics and would rely on the spiritual
guidance of the elite of social scientists.'2

Compte denied that there

are forms of rational activity other than those which conform to the
procedures of empirical science. The only standard of rationality is
that of science, and his refusal to regard philosophy or metaphysics as
domains of knowledge was based merely on the fact that their cognitive
claims cannot be justified by scientific methods of inquiry.

His "law"

of the "three stages" of human intellectual development prescribes the
direction which a progressively enlightened mankind ought to take. These
stages are treated by Compte, just as Hegel did, as inescapable "moments"
in the historical development of human thought. Just as Mannheim's
intellectuals, Compte's theories are intended to transcend all earlier
and lower forms of thought.
The guidance of politics by an elite of social scientists was
also the dream of Lester Ward who predicted the coming of a sociocratic

12. Auguste Compte. Positive Philosophy. Translated by Harriet
Martineau, London: Trubner & Co., 1853.
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world in which the primacy of knowledge over power would finally be
achieved.

In a similar manner Karl Mannheim movingly argues for the

need of an elite of intellectuals to put their hands on the tiller of
the state. He also sounds like the nineteenth-century men of the left
who declared their allegiance to the rationalism of the Enlightenment,
believing, as they did, in human progress through science. These men
sought to provide the basis for a new scientifically oriented ideology which would replace altogether what remained of the outlook of
medieval thought. What they aspired to was a completely humanistic
culture, securely based on the foundation of modern science.
The "end of ideology" theorists are also placing a great
emphasis on the decline of political radicalism and the decline of
Marxism.
declined.

They seem to argue that it is radical ideologies that have
Edward Shi 1s is explicit. He says:

"The yery heart which

has sustained idological politics among intellectuals over the past
century is gradually losing its strength. Marxism is decomposing."^
Unfortunately Marxism by no means has lost its appeal among intellectuals
and the public.

But even if Marxism were being deflated, politics by no

means would be rendered non-ideological. The disappearance of radicalism
and the deflation of doctrinaire Marxism cannot substantiate the thesis
that ideologies have ended.
ideological.

On the contrary, politics become more

Radicalism leaves little, if any, room, for debate and

13. Edward Shils. "Ideology and Civility: On the Politics of the
Intellectuals." Sewanee Review. LXCI""(July-September T958) , p. 4 5 3 .
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controversy.

The end of radical ideological systems has resulted in a

proliferation of sects that have intensified the ideological debate. As
Raymond Aron remarks, on second thought, "Ideological discussions are
incomparably richer now than during the cold war, when we had apologias
for the democratic-Keynesian-liberal synthesis. Today the very foundations of contemporary society are subject to debate."^
The writers to be discussed below see the decline of ideology
mainly as the result of the alleged similarities which can be observed
in the two political systems.
are the two systems converging?

But what are these similarities?

How

These writers have suggested that the

degree of government intervention into a capitalist economy and the
abandonment of demands by the left for total nationalization of the means
of production can be used to measure the trend toward convergence and
they claim that the trend is strong.

However, the convergence thesis, as

will be seen, disregards more fundamental differences among social
institutions and attitudes.
Daniel Bell has stated that, "Today our entire society is
committed to change, and in a direction which was first pointed out by the
Left."'5

In the East, communism no longer serves as the official ideology

for intellectuals who have lost faith that its goals can ever be attained.
In the West, faith in classical liberalism has waned and socialism today

14. Raymond Aron. "On the Proper Uses of Ideology." in Culture and its
Creators. Ed. by Joseph David and Terry Clark, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, p. 2.
15. Daniel Bell.

Ideology-A Debate, op" cit.'p.,72.
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provides the perspective on modern history which emphasizes that the
achievement of freedom and the defense of the individual constitute a
permanent revolution; and it tells us that this revolution resists any
final definition J 6

However, socialism in the United States is outside

the bounds of political possibility. Socialism requires that the
control and operation of the means of production, distribution, and
exchange should be in the hands of society rather than in the hands of
private individuals, groups, or corporations. Any attempt to bring
about socialism in the United States would involve a very sharp disensus
with the whole industrial-business-government establishment. The entire
institutional set-up in the United States is from a practical standpoint incompatible with socialism and precisely for this reason Lipset
has declared that socialism in the United States is politically and
ideologically deadJ?
Galbraith considers the end of ideology as being the consequence
of the convergence that supposedly is taking place gradually of the two
economic systems but he sees this convergence from a different standpoint.
He states:

16. Daniel Bell.

Ideology-A Debate.0p

c^t_

17. David Aiken.

'Ideology-A Debate, op". cit.'.P- 33.

p>

3'8#
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Industrial Societies have an economic
system which, whatever its formal
ideological billing, is in substantial
part a planned economy. The initiative
in deciding what is to be produced
comes not from the sovereign consumer
who, through the market, issues the
instructions that bend the productive
mechanism to his ultimate will. Rather
it comes from the great producing
organization which reaches forward to
control the market....One of the conclusions that follow from this analysis
is that there is a broad convergence
between industrial systems. The imperatives of technology and organization,
not the image of ideology, are what
determines the shape of economic society.

The alleged convergence of the two systems, according to
Galbraith, results then from some similarities that he sees in economic
planning.

Galbraith, however, admits that the sense of political

direction this system imparts is wrong.

It confuses and distorts, so

that man is directed into the very conflicts and pitfalls he wants to
avoidJ9

If such is the case, the new order that emerges will accentuate

social conflict and ideological controversies. Aside from the problems
into which he runs in his efforts to support his thesis, his notions carry
a considerable ideological weight.

He advocates that socialism should

be the guide in social thought and we should strive towards the achievement of this goal. But he advocates his own brand of socialism, a social-

18. J. K. Galbraith. The New Industrial State. New American Library,
New York and Scarborough, Ontario, 1972, p. 60.
19.

Ibid., pp. 113-115.
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ism under which power in public enterprise would not be exercised by
parliament or by its directly responsible agent, as has been the case
under democratic socialism, but a system with autonomous public corporations.
An attempt to portray the two systems as converging is made also
by Raymond Aron who maintains that "over the past thirty years the
extreme 'right' and 'left' disclosed identities which were more
impressive than their differences. British socialism has not resulted
in tyranny and has materially weakened the ideologies of thorough-going
socialism and thorough-going neo-liberalism."20 Aron's arguments seem
to be rather a criticism of the Marxist ideology and of traditional
conservatism.

He more or less argues that Marxism has lost much of its

appeal and only few believe that Marx's ideas can find practical application.

He also appears to be defending the status quo against two

different kinds of critics.
Aron believes that the Left has modified its position on many
issues and has departed considerably from the Marxist line.

It has come

to believe, according to Aron, that the reduction of inequalities is the
main objective and goal of the Left,21

whereas Marx believed that the

improvement of the human condition under a capitalist system can only
prolong its collapse. The intellectual debate now between Left and Right,
Aron argues, revolves around issues such as the extent to which planning
should take place and the kind of socialist measures to be instituted.
Aron's emphasis is on the passing of fanaticism in political belief and

20.

Quoted by Edward Shi Is in "The End of Ideology?" Encounter,

V:5 (November 1955), p. 53.
21. Raymond Aron. The Industrial Society. New York: Simon & Schuster,
1966, p. 45.
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the erosion of ideologies which were at one time sharp, distinct, and
explicit.^^ There is an increasing awareness that "the political
categories of the last century-Left and Right, liberal and socialist,
traditionalist and revolutionary-have lost their relevance."23 H-JS
observations of the various societies, Western and non-Western, led
him to believe that "in most Western and non-Western societies,
ideological controversy is dying down because experience has shown that
divergent demands can be reconciled."24
Aron's predictions about ideological trends proved to be premature.

The rise of the new left in Germany in the 1960s, the

radicalization of students all over the world, widespread assassinations
of political leaders, the sudden rise of Marxist, Maoist and MarxistLeninist parties, the civil war in Ireland and other events forced Aron
to reconsider his ideas.
The problem with the debate of the convergence of the two systems
is that it has remained plagued by conceptual confusion.

As has been

pointed out, any convergence of ideologies is out of the question and
any trend toward apparent convergence could at best refer to greater

22. Raymond Aron. The Opium of the Intellectuals.
Norton and Co., 1962.
23.
24.

New York: W. W.

Nations and Ideologies, op._cit.,'p. 24.
Ibid., p. 25.
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similarity on the level of institutional practices and techniques.d0
Or, as another writer has commented:

"It is conceivable that two

initially divergent systems increasingly come to resemble each other,
as common environmental problems force similar solutions on them
In practice, however, such convergence of systems with highly distinct
ideologies is not \iery likely.. .unless the two antithetical or
distinct ideologies themselves converge or are watered down or 'dismissed', any lasting convergence of the respective economic systems
themselves is not to be expected."26

i n the West we can naturally

expect considerable departure from the strictly capitalist system
because interests of different classes have produced different ideologies-the two major variants being conservatism and liberalism-and
therefore it is not impossible to regard any single ideology as the
determinant of the system.

But we are not to assume that a lasting

deviation can be afforded from the optimal one since public opinion and
the competition between systems would not permit it.
We do .

have to admit that the economic role of Western govern-

ments has been on the increase, but not in the direction of Soviet-type
planning.

In other words, the systems have been growing more similar in

25. Alexander Gerschenkron. Continuity in History. Cambridge,
Massachusetts; Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968,ch.3.
26. Albert Hirschman. "Ideology as a System Determinant." in
Comparison of Economic Systems. Ed. by Alexander Eckstein,
Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1971, p. 115.
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some respects and less similar in others.

In both cases the systems

keep undergoing substantial changes in their policies, even in the
underlying assumptions, though not so readily in their phraseology.
But this process does not mean in itself that they are getting closer
to one another in fundamental respects. We may notice some similarities
in specific patterns of income distribution but the basic difference in
the disposition of capital incomes and gains persists. Also, if
economic similarities had become more convincing than they actually
have, the political, ideological and psychological barriers to anything
resembling convergence would remain unchanged.

Each system would remain

committed to its institutions which would prevent any real trend toward
a convergence of the two systems.
0thers27 have emphasized the substitution of the orthodox
Leninist-Stalinist thesis with the substitution of "peaceful co-existence"
and "peaceful competition" and the abandonment of the Leninist thesis of
the inevitability of war with capitalism.

However, a weakening of political

tensions proves very little with respect to a convergence of socioeconomic systems.

Even an intensive long-range exchange of scientific and

technological experiences with co-operation on specific projects could
very well be possible between countries with divergent socio-economic
systems.

Certainly the constant emphasis by Eastern countries on the

impossibility of ideological adjustment and compromise on fundamental
principles, let alone convergence, is more than a straw in the wind.

27. Robert C. Tucker. "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements."
American Political Science Review, 61 (June. 196"7), pp."343,-358.
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The fact that the Soviet Union has adopted some kind and
degree of economic planning in a less than absolutely centralized
manner and the West has adopted some social policies, as well as the
fact that the West approves of some government intervention and the
nationalization of some industries, points to the ongoing transformation of each system, rather than a growing similarity between
them.

It does not point to the convergence nor the arrival of Social

Democracy.

The whole issue here is obscured by a semantic and con-

ceptual inertia that forces us to classify systems as capitalist,
socialist or social democratic. There is a pluralism of socioeconomic arrangements. There will continue to exist an endless and
constantly changing variety of 'systems' with different socio-economic
and attitudinai arrangements; British socialism will continue to differ
considerably or rather fundamentally from Soviet socialism and British
capitalism from American or French.

Each country will represent a given

set of arrangements but they will not converge.

Swedish socialism will

be different from African socialism and British socialism will differ
from American socialism.

In the Western countries we cannot even be

certain that within each country the existing socio-economic arrangements will remain permanent.

It must be pointed out also that a con-

trolled economy is not identical with a mixed economy.
However, even if democratic socialism has re-examined and revised
some of its ideological premises and the West has adopted some social
democratic policies, that is not sufficient to substantiate the claim
that ideologies have disappeared or even that ideological conflict has
abated.

It matters little if the overriding aim of social democrats is
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to adapt themselves to changing conditions or that they have revised
their positions on nationalization. The social democrats have realized
that no large-scale intervention of the government in the private sector
can be advocated without losing adherents. They are unable to provide
the ideological justification which would be accepted by the public.
We cannot speak meaningfully of convergence as long as the Communist
attitude, even in the age of the supposed detente, has been that no
convergence between socialism and capitalism is possible.^

For the

communist mind the only real way to terminate the existing pluralism of
systems is the final victory of communism everywhere.
When we speak of convergence of political orientations we must
remember that "convergence is neither complete, nor stable, nor new.
It bears witness to the pacification of some sectors of the ideological
fronts and perhaps also their shortcomings, but not necessarily a general
abatement of ideological fervor and commitment

Rather ideologies which

still differ in doctrinal postures and in the emphasis of priorities
reflect sooner or later the spread among part of their leaders and among
mass publics of genuine agreement about formerly disputed principles and
29
policies."
This kind of ideological agreement has been seen as the deideologization of politics. Agreement on political alternatives and, in
general, ideological agreement often is reached through national exigencies.
For example, we have the case of England which was ruled for thirty-four

28. Lloyd G. Reynolds. The Three Worlds of Economics. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1971.
29. Martin Seliger. Ideology and Politics. London: George Allen
and Unwin Limited, 1976 , pp. 239-240.
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years by coalition governments which handled questions and issues
such as the foundation of the Welfare State, the depression, total
mobilization and other equally controversial issues, which can divide
political parties.
National exigencies have forced political parties in Italy to
reach an agreement on certain ideological issues. The inability of
the Christian Democrats to capture the majority of the votes has
compelled them to seek co-operation with the socialists.

In turn,

the Christian Democrats were compelled to modify their position on
several issues and the socialists, in order to share the power, put
aside doctrinaire Marxism and modified their demands.
It would be more realistic to talk more modestly about a coexistence of democratic socialist ideologies and capitalism and about
a truce between Marxism and Western ideologies. There is no evidence
which points to the convergence of the two socio-economic systems that
can enable one to speak meaningfully about the decline of ideologies.
The end of ideology has, however, not been proclaimed only by
intellectuals of the left but also by intellectuals of the right, some
of whom are high government officials. Their motives for dismissing
ideologies as a thing of the past are different from those which come
from the ranks of the left. Much of what they consider as a decline in
ideology, however, is simply ideology.

They want the creation of a new

ideology that advocates commitment to technology.

They want the creation

of a society ruled by high-level political administrators and bureaucrats.
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Today societies are highly committed to industrialization.
In the industrial society, science and technological knowledge have
high values. The industrial society is dedicated to hard work and a
keen sense of individual responsibility for performance of assigned
tasks and norms.

Ideology, to a considerable extent, is the cement that

will hold such a society together.

But it is an ideology which states

the new technology and defines the economic and social relations which
are sought to be most compatible with its fullest development.

"Since

an ideology is at the center of this class, there must be 'highpriests'
to interpret and apply this ideology to current development."30

yne

function of these "high priests" is to create a consensus, to make this
consensus into a reasonably consistent body of ideas. They must formulate
and restate the major values, premises, and consensus of a society.

To

achieve this consensus, one has to extol the dominant values of the society
and to deprecate the opposing ideologies, ideologies which would prevent
the attainment of the consensus.
Government officials in the United States, for example, have gone
a long way toward de-emphasizing the role of ideologies, ideologies which
are opposed to the dominant American values. While they claim that ideologies have ceased to exert any influence in the policies of the government,
they assert that the Administration is motivated by a "spiritual view of

30. Clark Kerr et al. Industrialism and Industrial Man. London:
Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 43.
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man and

the ethic that mankind is moving towards higher standards,

towards God."

In other words, Carter's diplomacy, says Brzezinski, is

"non-ideological in thrust but based on certain philosophical values".31
Brzezinski continues by saying that the alternative the United States
offers to the concept of historical inevitability is one based on greater
pluralism and an increasing fulfilment of global aspirations for human
rights.

Thus ideology for him is anything that is not consistent with the

dominant American values, any belief system which is characterized by
rigidity, dogmatism and fanaticism.

This becomes more obvious if we

read some of his definitions of ideology. An ideology, according to
Brzezinski, "seeks to promote a particular system on the basis of rigid
doctrine

Ours is a philosophically rooted policy, based on fundamental

notions about the nature of man, morality and justice, but it does not
seek to promote specific systems."32
The argument that these political thinkers are the exponents of
a new ideology becomes more credible as we look at the views of other
writers.

They seem to express an ideology which advocates devotion to

duty and responsibility for performance and an ethic which motivates
individuals to espouse the ethical valuations toward work and accumulation.
Spengler employs the term in the sense that ideology provides an all-

.31. Time Europe.
32.

Ibid.

September 5, 1977.
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embracing picture of social reality, that it interprets the entire
future development of mankind from a single view and has consequences
in relation to the course of history.

For the ideologue, history is

predetermined and its aims and values emanate from fundamental theoretical prerequisites.

Ideology is a totality of dogmatic ideas cut from

the living reality.

The adherence to ideological principles prevents

the individual from assessing correctly specific measures that are
taken to correct social problems. Consequently, "Ideology...retards
both economic development and political development."33

Thus, ideology

is seen as an obstacle to the espousal of the values of hard work and
accumulation.
Schlesinger holds a similar view as he says:

"By ideology I

mean a body of systematic and rigid dogma by which people seek to understand the world-and to preserve or transform it."34 Therefore, he
asserts, programmes undertaken by governments to increase overall production, to resolve problems of unemployment and, in general, the
technological approach to the solution of problems, are more effective
than policies guided by ideologies, if ideologies are to be understood
in this manner.

33. J. J. Spengler.
"Theory, Ideology, Non-economic Values and
Politico-Economic Development" in Tradition, Values and Socio-Economic
Development. Ed. by R. Braibenti & J. J. Spengler, Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1961 , P- 3 1 .
34.

Time Europe. September, 1977, p. 8.
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THE INFLUENCE OF THE "WESTERN" IDEOLOGIES

If exponents of the decline of ideology thesis search for the
kind of "ideological" thinking that takes a rigid and dogmatic approach
to politics, one that has a doctrinaire perception of politics, they
will be completely unable to demonstrate that ideologies have declined.
There are the other values of ideology which revolve around such
important norms as liberty, equality, humanity, freedom, democracy, etc.
There are goals which individuals seek to promote but within the framework of an open society. There are values and goals which are championed
by ideologies that do not posit an ultimate value, a final goal, a
Utopia. These are ideologies which do not insist on the realization of
the ideal, which is contained in the sacred, and do not seek a total
transformation of society.
Geertz, who does not conceive of ideology as being radical,
dogmatic, or revolutionary, writes that "we may wait as long for the
'end of ideology' as the positivists have waited for the end of religion."
But Geertz views ideology as one of the forms of cultural patterns which
have provided practical orientations whereby individuals are able to give
some coherence to their social circumstances.36

35. Clifford Geertz. "Ideology as a Cultural System." in Ideology
and Discontent. Ed. by David Apter, New York: The Free Press, 1964 •>
p. 63.
36. Ibid., p. 51.
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Lipset and Bell have seen ideology as playing a role only
in areas in which there is rapid transformation while its impact is
marginal in the developed societies of the West.

Ideologies, they

maintain, exercise appeal only in those countries which were colonies
or political dependencies. According to them, ideologies in such
countries were used as instruments for waging the fight for liberation
from foreign domination.

Ideologies were and are needed to arouse the

people against foreign rulers. But such arguments do not provide
sufficient explanation of the political extremism that we find, for
example, in Latin America. The entire revolutionary package includes
such standard components as the growth of industrial cities, the
proliferation of science and secularism, and the drastic broadening of
the base of political participation.
In the United States, where most of the attention of the
exponents of the decline thesis has been focused, doctrinaire Marxism
and extremist movements may exercise \/ery little appeal and only on a
small number of people.

However, it cannot be argued that commitment

to an ideology is weak.

In the United States, faith in liberal democracy

still remains strong despite some claims to the contrary.

Liberal

democracy exercises strong appeal and inspires the public. As Selinger
points out:
There are no valid logical or empirical
reasons for denying that democratic
liberal belief systems can inspire
intense commitment. The foundation of
such a commitment is provided by the
demonstrable reference to central values
in all political belief systems. Both
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fascism and communist condemnation of
bourgeoise morality in society and
politics has its counterpart in the
unashamedly moral rejection of the two
totalitarian systems by reform-minded
liberal democrats and democratic
socialists.37
Indeed, American liberalism today displays a high level of abstraction
and evokes strong conviction.

American liberals view freedom as

participation and effective choice and are much closer to the "constructive rationalism" of Rousseau and Voltaire. This is also attested
by the fact that communism and socialism have had no important effect in
the United States as alternative political philosophies.
Sometimes liberalism appears as merely a ritual preference for
the middle of the road which leads many to believe that it is dead.

But

liberalism is much more than that for those who adhere to it and its
adherents are not few.

For its adherents, liberalism "is a coherent

social philosophy which combines the ideals of classical liberalism
with the psychological and political realities of modern pluralistic
society."38

The reason why it may appear not as a force capable of

eliciting the commitment of individuals and it may seem to have become a
common denominator of American political rhetoric is that people have
espoused the belief that liberalism survives "basically in a situation
where long-range goals are feasible and where these goals can be actualized
by a consensus apparatus.

But to have long-range goals presupposes the

37. Martin Seliger. Ideology and Politics. London:
and Unwin Limited, 1976, p. 141.

George Allen

38. Irving Louis Horowitz. Foundations of Political Ideology.
New York: Harper & Row, 1972, p. 141.
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social system that has time, and presupposes a network of fundamental agreements and a series of disagreements on tactical questions."39
The system, then, must be based on harmonies and equalities and where
inequalities exist it must attempt to reduce them.

There must also

be an equilibrium between the powerful and the powerless because otherwise its capacity to achieve its goals will be seriously reduced. The
attempt to create a network of fundamental agreements has given rise to
the misapprehension that politics is non-ideological, that there is a
convergence of political orientations.
The impression that Western politics is in the process of losing
its ideological character stems also from the existence of a growing
belief in deomcratic institutions.
is an essential prerequisite.

If democracy is to flourish, stability

Democracy requires that extreme positions

be reconciled and politics be conducted in an atmosphere that is not
conducive to the sharpening of conflict. The events of the last thirtyfive years have given rise to a fear of too much politicization, a
suspicion that intense political commitment and passionate politics
automatically eventuates in "total" politics-a conception of politics
advanced by theorists of National Socialism and communism.

This fear by

the public forces political parties to avoid extreme positions because
most likely they will be penalized by the public. The avoidance of
extreme positions has been equated by the exponents of the decline-ofideology thesis with the decline of ideology.

39. Irving Louis Horowitz.
op. cit., p. 143.

Foundations of Political Ideology,
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What we are actually witnessing today is "the ruling trend of
contemporary theory (which) has been reacting against the more optimistic philosophies of ideologies of the past two centuries; consciously or implicitly, it has been set about deflating the larger ideas
of human possibilities that recommended themselves to many thinkers in
the past, and has engaged in the job of cutting our notions of man's
nature to size."40

The choice today is not between all-inclusive and

mutually exclusive alternatives.

The writers who believed that ideology

is declining or has declined have assumed that every important characteristic of a society is connected with a single governing mechanism, that
a society can be transformed from a central point. They have assumed
that ideological thinking is totalistic and it adopts global views of
social structure and political action.

It is true that in the past

attempts were made to transform society and eradicate social evils from
a central point.

But the characteristic of ideology is not the aim to

transform society from a central point.
Many people today are convinced that society cannot be transformed globally because such attempts have never been successful.
to bring about total transformation lead to perpetual force.

Attempts

Social

transformation will not be achieved by ideologies that consist of myths,
superstitions, dogmatism and fanaticism.

There

is nothing rational

about such ideologies and for one to claim that such characteristics
could bring about social reforms and social improvement, "would be as

40. P. H. Partridge. "Politics, Philosophy, Ideology."
in Political Philosophy. Ed. by Anthony Quinton, London:
Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 40.
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strange as to say that an earthquake is a good way of producing a
lake."41

The French Revolution did not succeed in producing the

results that "ideologists" believed would be achieved because they were
incompatible with the social reforms it espoused.

The totalistic

illusion has been a cause for many upheavals. All attempts to transform society globally resulted in failures and destruction on a
monstrous scale.

If this totalistic illusion is being abandoned, it

would be because those who were possessed by such an illusion are
becoming convinced that the idea of total transformation leads to
perpetual force and fanaticism which blinds people and prevents them
from understanding their own limitations.

It would also constitute

evidence that rational ideologies are winning ground by gaining
adherents;

rational ideologies are those that do not exclude the

possibility of alternative choices and alternative means to achieve
social reforms.
It has been argued that there is an acceptance of the belief
that industrialism, technological innovation, and uninterrupted expansion
of resources should be the main purposes of social life.

It is assumed

that the acceptance of such a belief renders politics non-ideological.
However, such a belief is still very much ideological. Man is committed
to certain purposes which are ethical in nature.
It has been argued also that today's societies are committed to
the politics of pragmatism, to the politics of incremental improvement

41. P. H. Partridge.
p. 40.

Politics, Philosophy, Ideology,

op. cit.,
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rather than to thorough reforms.

However, even if one prefers a

system that is committed to incremental improvements rather than
improvements which can be achieved through thorough reforms, he is
making an ideological choice.

Even Lipset, one of those who force-

fully has argued that ideologies are declining, admits that this
constitutes an ideological commitment.

He states:

Clearly, commitment to the politics of
pragmatism, to the rules of the game of
collective bargaining, to gradual change
whether in the direction favored by the
left or the right, to opposition both to
an all powerful central state and to
laissez-faire constitutes the component
parts of an ideology7} The 'agreement on
fundamentals', the political consensus of
Western society, now increasingly has come
to include a position on matters which
once sharply separated the left from the
right. And this ideological agreement...
has become the ideology of the major
parties in the developed states of Europe
and America.42

Even if ideology is to be seen in terms of conflict of ideas,
in terms of intellectual conflicts among groups representing different
views, as Lipset sees it, still it cannot be argued that ideologies have
c

declined.

The disappearance of doctrinal Marxism, if indeed is has

disappeared, has resulted in more ideological debate. This decline has
brought a proliferation of sects, each incriminating the other and all
of which are engaged in a fervent search for alternatives that can ful-

42. S. M. Lipset. "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary
European Politics." Daedalus, 93 (Winter 1964), p. 296.
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fill men's desires for communion although none of these groups has
elaborated a new ideological system or has been able to provide the
theoretical framework for a mass party. As Aron remarks, ideological
discussions are incomparably richer now than during the cold war, when
we had dogmatic assertions from one side and, from the other, apologias
for the democratic-Keynesian-liberal synthesis.43
Despite the fact that the right and left have taken as their
goal the increase of production and a more equitable distribution of the
fruits of economic progress, there remains plenty of room for social
and political conflict between the right and left, between socialism
and liberalism.

Aron, in an attempt to clarify his earlier formulations,

states that:
The dual allegiance of democratic nations to
liberalism and egalitarianism creates an
inevitable and immense disparity between
what democracy is and what it is supposed to
be. Only...ideology purports to bridge this
gap between the real and the ideal. The end
of ideology meant not the end of ideas but the
end of pseudorational or rationalistic
millenarianism of which Marxism-Leninism
furnished the most recent example.44
Ideology should not be seen only in terms of adherence to the
great ideological systems but also in terms of preferences, expectations
and values not necessarily constituting an elaborate system and one which

43. Raymond Aron. "On the Proper Uses of Ideology." in Culture and
its Creators. Ed. by J. David and Terry Clark, Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1977, p. 7.
44.

Ibid.
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is along the lines of the great ideological traditions. When we see
ideology in such terms, we find that the common people have political
opinions, in many cases fairly specific ones, and are often critical
of government action and inaction.

Poor and less educated people find

ways to orient themselves to the political arena and develop points of
view which we would expect to be fairly consistent over time. They may
lack ideological clarity, as Converse argues, but we should not mistake any absence of clarity for a total absence of views and concerns
which are ideological in nature.
CONCLUSION
The writers who have argued that ideologies have declined have
confused the decline of something they have found objectionable, namely,
dogmatism, fanaticism, and in general, those ideologies which have the
above characteristics such as revolutionary Marxism and Fascism.

This

narrow focus fails to include a broader conceptual framework that would
permit analytical attention to other aspects of ideology. They have sidestepped the fascinating subject of a broader ideological analysis and
have concentrated instead on the central proposition that runs through
much of their writings, namely, apocalyptic and revolutionary ideologies
have lost their power to inspire the masses. They also have concentrated
on the proposition that ideology tends to wane as societies reach levels
of social and economic modernization typified by several Western countries.
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Their arguments seem to rest on the assumption that socioeconomic and political developments are moving in a deterministic
and unilinear direction and towards a kind of society which will
espouse the Social Democratic values. This leads to another interpretation, namely, that most of the writings are not an analysis of
ideology but simply more ideology.

This has been most forcefully

stated by William Delany who says that "the end of ideology writers
write not just as sociologists or social scientists but as journalists
and an anti-totalitarian ideological cabal. Their work is ideology
but, almost like all Western ideologies since the 18th century, with
a heavy 'scientific1 component to give respectability and a sense of
truth."45

These are harsh judgments but if we look at the develop-

ments everywhere and at the literature about the decline of ideology,
their assumptions suggest exactly that. One is led to this interpretation by the convergency theory that they have expounded, that the
two systems are converging giving rise to a society which is governed
by the principles of Social Democracy.

The social democratic society

allegedly emerges from the convergence of the capitalist and communist
systems.

However, this thesis tends to disregard more fundamental

differences among social institutions and attitudes.
The writings of the exponents of the decline of ideology thesis
seem to reflect also a desire to reject something which they see as
dogmatic, inflexible, and passionately articulated prescriptions of
reality.

But ideology cannot be defined in this manner and cannot

45. William Delany. The End of Ideology: A Summation. Paper presented
at the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, p. 16.
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necessarily be seen as an obstacle of human progress. The striving
towards ultimate ends and the sense of responsibility and purposes are
not to be regarded as polar opposites, the one being associated with
chiliastic politics and the other with practical politics or the lack
of any commitment to an idea.

If the politician is to act as the agent

of social progress, he has to take into account the consequences of
political action but at the same time have a vision in mind.

"Certainly",

says Weber, "all historical experience confirms the truth that man should
not have attained the possible unless time and again he reached out for
the impossible."46
The exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis have failed to
demonstrate that ideologies have declined.

It is obvious that the

exhaustion of political ideas in the West refers to the particular case
involving the disillusionment that was experienced by Marxist intellectuals
when it became apparent that many predictions of Marxism did not materialize
and when the atrocities of the Stalinist regime were publicly revealed.
This led to an ideological reappraisal.

But as La Palombra has remarked,

"to limit the meaning of ideology to absolute Utopias, to concentrate one's
analytical attention upon what some Marxist socialists may be up to, and
to equate certain changes in rhetoric with ideological decline is to
narrow the meaning of the central concept to the point where it has very
limited utility for the social scientist."47

46. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills.
Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 20.

From Max Weber.

New York:

47. Joseph La Palombra. "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and
Interpretation." American Political Science Review. 60:1 [March
p. 8.

1966),
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Among those intellectuals who experienced a disillusionment
were many of the exponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis. These
intellectuals became disillusioned with the inability or the refusal of
other intellectuals to effect radical change. The totalitarianism of
Soviet Russia forced most of them to move away from Marxism as a
viable alternative for change. By expounding the decline thesis, they
were expressing their own feelings. Since Marxism no longer inspired
them, they went further to assume that Marxism no longer inspired others.
Thus these intellectuals moved towards an ideological vacuum.

Being

themselves in an ideological vacuum, they hastened to proclaim the end
of ideology.

Having been strong ideological believers, however, they

could not sit back and observe the political phenomena

with indifference.

They began to look for an alternative to the two systems. The alternative
was found in the politics of Social Democracy, at least by some. Social
Democracy, by stressing the need for a mixed economy and by explicitly
recognizing the private sector, seemed to offer an alternative to those
who had lost faith in the two great ideological systems. Thus they
hastened to hail the arrival of Social Democracy which led them to
formulate the convergence theory.
It is ironic that while these political theorists were proclaiming
the end of ideology and while they were making the assertion that Western
democracies were experiencing the "end of ideology", those who determined
public policy in the United States were making statements that the Western
world was living through a time of troubles that could very well be called
the Age of Ideology.

In 1964, the Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara

- 69 -

testified before a Congressional Committee that the Communist threat
"is political, it is ideological, it is economic, it is scientific;
and it extends even into the cultural sphere."48
his Farewell Address to the nation,

Eisenhower said in

"We face a hostile ideology-global

in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose, and insidious in
method."49
I have mentioned these examples to dramatize the argument that
the writings of these political theorists about the decline of ideology
expressed the desire to see the emergence of a new ideology. Their
writings could not be a serious analysis of the political, economic and
ideological trends of the period when awareness of ideology permeated
the thoughts of high government officials, of those who determine the
ideological direction of their countries.

Not only did they fail to

provide a serious analysis of the political, economic and ideological trends
of that period but they also failed to provide a serious analysis of
ideology as a concept. They failed to see ideology as a set of values,
expectations, aspirations and prescriptions.

They insisted on seeing

ideology as something dogmatically articulated regarding class conflict,
revolution, and mass movements which is not the essential nature of ideology.
The global concept of ideology as a Utopian vision or a welldeveloped sense of justice encompassing a thorough world view should not

48. Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 88th
Congress, Second Session (Washington: D. S. Government Printing Office,
March 25, 1964), pp. 83-84.
49.

The Department of State Bulletin (February 6, 1961), p. 180.
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obscure more common, mundane concerns. The absence of radical ideologies
has led the advocates of the thesis that ideologies have declined to
conclude too quickly that because there were no revolutionary or mass
movements, there were also no concerns or bitterness. Clearly, many
people are not satisfied with the existing order although they may have
some difficulty articulating their criticism.

There are people who have

a series of dissatisfactions with the kind of politics pursued by their
governments and the activities in which these governments are engaged.
They are concerned with economic equality, justice, human rights, the
foreign policies pursued by their government, and other issues. One way
to reconstruct the concept of ideology is to see it as an expression of
concern about the distribution of resources, economic or political, as
the individual sees this distribution.

Individuals may see the distri-

bution of resources as best achieved through the Welfare State, communism,
liberalism, Social Democracy, or any other system that incorporates
elements of the other social systems.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
The participants in the Conference on the "Future of Freedom"
attributed the presumed decline of ideology largely to the emergence
of an industrial society in which politics would be conducted from a
non-ideological standpoint.
society?

How did they define this post-industrial

Is there such a thing as post-industrial society?

How does

it differ from the industrial society?
According to the participants, the constituent element of this
type of society is a movement towards a democratic socialist system.
Western societies will move through a process of socialization and
Soviet societies will move through a process of liberalization.

Thus we

should expect the mutually hostile and antagonistic systems to come
together at some unspecified date in a form of democratic socialism.
The key notion which will render politics non-ideological is that conflicting interests will be reconciled within the framework of the Welfare
State.

This post-industrial society will be defined mainly by its

scientific spirit.

It will have science and technology as its basic

preconditions. The principles of science and technology will be applied
to the solution of social problems, thus leaving little scope for
ideological controversies.

Most of the participants of the Conference

envisioned a post-industrial society which will be capable of incorporating disruptive movements by meeting immediate demands. This society
will be capable of satisfying discontented people, people who are prepared
to join and support any movement because it promises to relieve their
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grievances.

It will prevent the emergence of opposition movements,

movements which consist of an integrating critique of society, because
there will be a distribution of wealth and a reduction of inequalities
of any political significance. Thus, movements which have radical
goals will become important.
Therefore, the advancement of industrialization is seen as the
process that logically necessitates the decomposition of social classes
by causing a growth of affluence which makes possible "a social system
in which class conflict is minimized"!
conflict.

anc j

consequently also ideological

As a result, cleavages disappear and a consensus will have

been reached.

Such an assumption, however, is erroneous because the

"industrial" society will never reach a final equilibrium, even if
differences among classes are minimized, because the contest between the
forces for uniformity and diversity will give it life and movement and
change.
Lipset has also argued that intellectuals in such a society
will function only as critics of that society because "domestic politics,
even liberal or socialist politics, can no longer serve as the arena of
serious criticism from the left." 2 The intellectual in this postindustrial society will reject the radical commitment required by an
"ethic of consciousness which creates true believers with pure, unquench-

1. Seymour Martin Lipset. The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary
furopean Politics.op. cit., p. 287.
2.
Politics.

New York:

Political Man: The Social Bases of
Doubleday, 1960, p. 408.
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able flame and can accept no compromise with faith."-3
Lipset further claims that radical movements in the West have
ceased to exist because:
The fundamental political problems of
the industrial revolution have been
solved: the workers have achieved
industrial and political citizenship...
the democratic left has recognized that
an increase in overall state power
carries with it more dangers to freedom than solutions for economic problems.
This very triumph of the democratic
social revolution in the West ends
domestic politics for those who must
have ideologies or Utopias to motivate
them to political action.4
In sharp contrast to Upset's arguments stand the arguments
advanced by some that there will be an increasing intervention in the
economic sphere by governments to achieve rapid economic growth.

The

public is becoming less apprehensive of strengthened state power and
is prepared to sacrifice some of its freedoms for the attainment of
economic growth.

Labor organizations will cease to be component parts

of class movements urging programmes of total reforms but will be a
part of a web of rules set mainly by the state.5

Contrary to what is

being argued, however, people today are more troubled by the apparent lesson
of history that the more the state, in whatever form, attempts to control

3. Seymour Martin Lipset. Political Man: The Social Bases of
Politics, op. cit., p. 408.
4.

Ibid., p. 406.

5. Clark Kerr et al. Industrialism and Industrial Man.
Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 235.

London:
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society, for whatever desirable ends, the more the individual is
smothered.
These political writers have also argued that the post-industrial
society will be a knowledgeable society.

Social objectives and goals

will be determined by rational criteria.

Knowledge and rationality

will be the criteria by which we will judge policies and political
action.

Knowledge, they imply, will compel a rethinking of value

positions by challenging assumptions with a reliable knowledge of
empirical reality.

Technology and science will permeate social

institutions and will transform them.
The theme was developed first at the Conference of the Congress
for Cultural Freedom out of which the theme of "the end of ideology"
developed.

The participants came expecting, and in a way inviting,

a great confrontation of world views. During this Conference it was
admitted that under the pressure of economic and social knowledge, a
growing body of research, and the increasing experience of society,
ideological argument tended to give way to technical argument.6

These

men must have experienced the effects of ideology in the wery narrowing
sense of the term as used by Rokeach in The Open and Closed Mind.
According to Rokeach, the manner in which the characteristics of a
knowledgeable society reduces ideological thinking, is through the
reduction of dogmatic thinking.

Dogmatic thinking can be conceived as a

6. Daniel Bell. "The End of Ideology in the West", in The End of Ideology.
Glencoe: Free Press, 1960; Edward Shils.
"The End of Ideology?"
Encounter. 5 (November, 1955), pp. 52-58; S. M. Lipset. "The End of
Ideology?" in Political Man, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960.
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selection and interpretation of information so as to reinforce a
previously established creed, dogma, or political ideology.

Information

is used not so much as a means of understanding the world as it is in
reality, but as a means of defending against conflict and uncertainty.''
The knowledgeable society puts a greater stress on the use of information, relying on its truth and not on any defence. This should be
associated with the decline in dogmatic thinking.

For the exponents of

the decline-of-ideology thesis, the decline of dogmatism apparently
implies the decline of ideology.
The theory of the knowledgeable society was picked up and
developed further by Robert Lane who asserts that the criteria and
scope of politics are shrinking while those of knowledge are growing.
As a consequence, ideology declines. According to Robert Lane, public
policy in the so-called knowledgeable society will be characterized by
the displacement of politics and ideology, caused by the constant expansion of "knowledge":
If one thinks of the domain of 'pure
polities' where decisions are determined
by calculations of influence, power, or
electoral advantage, and a domain of pure
knowledge where decisions are determined
by calculations of how to implement agreedupon values with rationality and
efficiency, it appears to me that the
political domain is shrinking and the
knowledge domain is growing, in terms of
criteria for deciding, kinds of counsel
sought, evidence adduced, and the nature of
the 'rationality' employed.8

7. Milton Rokeach.
1960, pp. 67-97.

The Open and Closed Mind.

New York:

Basic Books,

8. Robert Lane. "The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable
Society," The American Sociological Review, 31.(Q C t 0 b e r 1966)» PP- 567-568.
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With respect to ideology Lane asserts:

If we employ the term ideology to mean
a comprehensive, passionately believed,
self-activating view of society,
usually organized as a social movement
rather than as a latent half-conscious
belief system, it makes sense to think
of a domain of knowledge distinguishable
from the domain of ideology, despite the
extent to which they may overlap. Since
knowledge and ideology serve somewhat
functional equivalents in orienting a
person towards the problems he must face
and the policies he must select, the
growth of the domain of knowledge causes
it to impinge on the domain of ideology.9
There is, however, another side of the argument, a side that
Lane does not elaborate..

Ideology and politics are just as likely

to impinge upon the domain of "knowledge" as "knowledge" is likely to
impinge upon the domain of ideology and politics. The neglect of this
part of the knowledge-politics-ideology relationship stems from a view
of knowledge as being a monolithic commodity with a fairly uniform
impact upon public policy.

By not distinguishing among kinds and uses

of knowledge, such a view tends to confuse "knowledge" with the process
of bureaucratic administration.
When Lane describes "knowledge" as a domain distinctive from
ideology and politics, it becomes similar in concept to bureaucracy in
the traditional Weberian senseJO

The operative definition of knowledge

9. Robert Lane. The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society, op. cit., p. 660.
10. H. Geerth and C. Wright Mills. From Max Weber.
Oxford University Press, 1958, pp. 196-244.

New York:
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which is characteristic of highly developed bureaucracies, according
to this concept, is bureaucratic epistemology.

This is the screen

through which all information must pass to be examined before it
becomes knowledge. This screen is one of the basic agencies by which the
autonomy of process is ensured J 1
Furthermore, according to this concept, bureaucracy is a valuefree instrument, just a tool, which men must decide how to use by
standards drawn from some other sources than the realms of science,
technology, and bureaucracy.

However, it is misleading to say that

bureaucracy or science are neutral means that can be used to achieve an
end. Here the means profoundly shape the ends.

Bureaucracy may have

no ultimate values, but it has a host of instrumental values, and among
these is a conception of what counts as knowledge or useful information.
This bureaucratic epistemology shapes so decisively the outcomes that if
we assign a certain task to the bureaucratic agency, we can say beforehand how the bureaucratic epistemology will constitute and alter the task
itself.
The error in the first arguments, that industrialization will
produce structures and processes which will decompose classes, lies in
the assumption that a particular value system leads necessarily to
particular processes and structures and that this value system is spread
evenly through the society.

What happens, however, is the contrary.

Industrialization produces conflicting orientations.

It produces value

11. Kenneth Keniston. The Uncommitted: Alientated Youth in American
Society, New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1967, pp. 253-72.
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patterns which are not shared by all classes in the industrial society.
It has been demonstrated that the adoption of equality of opportunity
as the norm in the middle class is likely to inspire opposite, compensating values in those who do not reach a socially acceptable standard
of successJ2

Robert Lane has found also that industrialization, as far

as the working classes are concerned, is not accompanied by values that
distinguish them from agricultural or feudal societies J 3

industrialization

not only does not resolve fundamental problems but it is likely to
accentuate class conflict and social turmoil.

Economic differences do

not clearly decrease and can even be maintained or subjectively increased
by industrialization.

As Robert Lane remarks:

It is important to remember that the affluent
society still includes a large number of \/ery
poor people: the average income of the
poorest fifth of the families...in the United
States in 1962 was $1,662 and this had to
provide for a little over three people on the
average. The term 'affluence' is clearly
relative both to other societies and previous
periods.14
Advanced industrialization may widen the gap that exists among various
classes in society.

Advanced industrialization requires specialization

and high skills which can be acquired by education.

However, since

education is more accessible to the affluent classes, the distance between

12. Robert K. Merton. "Social Structure and Anomie," in Social Structure.
New York: The Free Press, 1957, p. 135.
13. Robert Lane. Political Ideology: Why the Common Man Believes What
He Does. New York: The Free Press, 1962, p. 80.
14.
"The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence."
American Science Review » 59:4 (December 1965 0, p. 876.
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the low and the upper classes will become longer.

In fact it may

increase discontent and sharpen conflict.
Industrialization, then, cannot provide any guarantee that
economic barriers separating social groups will be removed and that
the political significance of economic inequality will disappear.
A rise in the level of production and consumption is basically what
can be achieved but this is not of overriding importance. As soon
as the basic economic issues will be resolved, other issues will
emerge.

Indeed, the realignment that took place in the United States

between 1968-1972 reflected ideological differences on newly emerging
issues. As the importance of basic economic issues declined, a consensus was not achieved.

Usually, after a realignment takes place,

the losing party moves toward the position of the victorious party to
reattract the lost voters. Thus, the parties converge ideologically
and a consensus is achieved.
mentioned period.

But this did not happen during the above-

With the resolution of basic economic issues, other

issues came into the surface which are referred to as social issues.'^
The new issues that may emerge can be more serious than the economic
issues that are resolved as soon as the public ceases to be preoccupied
with such issues.
Not only does economic development not lead to the disappearance
of ideological conflict or a consensus on issues but it can accentuate

15. Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg.
New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1970.

The Real Majority.
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ideological conflict. One of the consequences of an increase in
affluence, which will result from economic development, will be an
increase in literacy, education and exposure to the information
which will promote greater political activity and interest in
politics.

Expansion of participation will result in an increase

of political efficacy and an increase in the knowledge of political
and social problems. This, in turn, will increase the need for the
society to do something about these problems and if it is unable to
resolve them, more political conflict will be generated.

Effective

government action will be more difficult and increased demands for
social change and innovation will be more difficult to satisfy. The
conflict will be in proportion to the gap that will exist between
what the government can accomplish and the ideas people will have as
to what the government ought to accomplish.

Such a conflict will

place enormous strain on political parties to meet the various demands.
Thus, instead of a convergence of ideological positions of the political
parties, we may have a divergence of ideological positions. This will
be the case because political parties will be forced to espouse the
cause of the social groups that will demand social action and innovation,
a more equitable distribution of the benefits of the industrial society
and an improvement in the quality of their lives. On the other side
will be those who will have e^ery reason to defend the benefits that
have accrued to them from industrialization.
Education and increased exposure to information will give rise
to enhanced aspirations and expectations.

If these aspirations and
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expectations are not satisfied, people will be motivated to be
involved in politics to exert more and stronger pressure on their
governments.

Thus, the economic development and improvement which

is supposed to satisfy needs and fulfill certain aspirations, may,
in fact, exacerbate these aspirations and generate others.
Social mobilization is another consequence of economic development and industrialization.

In turn, the consequence of social

mobilization is that classes are no longer composed of individuals
whose social position is an inherited and inescapable fate.

Individuals

begin to realize that they have the power to advance their claims and
alter social conditions. Thus, industrialization "increases capacities
for group organization and consequently the strength of group demands
on government, which the government is unable to satisfy."16
Economic development must be accompanied by an increase in
equality of conditions otherwise the process of economic development
is itself a shock to the integrative functions of society.!7

What

happens, however, is that industrialization increases the income of some
people absolutely but not relatively and hence increases their dissatisfaction with the existing order.18

Furthermore, industrialization

16. Eric A. Nordlinger. Politics and Society.
Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1970, p. 325.
17.

Englewood Cliffs, New

Ibid.

18. Samuel Huntington. Political Order in Changing Societies.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, ch. 1.
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disrupts social solidarity by abolishing the differentiation
of social roles.

People come into contact with more heterogeneous

groups, the flow of information is facilitated, and an openness is
created.

The cost of this openness is a weaker set of affective

ties linking individuals to the social system.^

The question is,

then, if developed societies can afford the costs in social solidarity of these weak ties.
Industrialization and economic progress reduce the number of the
propertyless and increases private ownership which gives increasing
numbers of people something to defend and therefore gives them a stake
in the social system in which they live.
improvement

Furthermore, the gradual

of living conditions arouses a hope that the revolutionary

fervour decreases as well as the desire to drastically reform the
existing social system which is undesirable for the left. Thus, the
left would be preparing its own demise by abandoning its intransigence,
which has been interpreted by some as a convergence of ideological
positions.

Consequently, the left may be forced to adopt again a

radical stand on social issues and abandon its previous moderate stand.
Indeed, Robert Lane has found that more people are now looking towards
the future as a period which offers a greater promise of a happier
life.2°

19. Samuel Huntington.
op. cit., ch. 1.

Political Order in Changing Societies,

20. Robert Lane. The Politics of Consensus in the Age of Affluence,
op. cit., p. 878.
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An increased optimism, however, which is generated by
industrialization and economic development, may have other consequences.

As it has been remarked, "...the technological society

has produced unprecedented freedom from want, from insecurity, from
poverty, hunger, and disease, and...these real gains make possible
the most radical visions of a possible future."21

The problem is

that, when one envisions a brighter future, he tends to become more
dissatisfied with the current state of affairs and thus becomes
anxious to change things. Also, when a society becomes more affluent,
it abandons traditional orientations. A great sense of mastery over
fate emerges and individuals cease to see themselves as helpless objects
of forces beyond human control and acquire a faith that great goals
can be attained.

As a consequence, they may agitate for radical reforms.

Agitation for radical reforms can result from our efforts to
achieve goals through rational and efficient calculations, from efforts
to subordinate qualitative dimensions to the common, external, and
quantifiable.^2

In that case people will require

power which strives

to become authority that will respond to human needs, to those questions
which have meaning for men. The uprisings, the challenging of
established institutions and processes that we have witnessed are the
cries of people who feel that the processes and powers which control

21. Clark Kerr. The Uses of the University.
University Press, 1963, p. 20.
22. Michael Novak.
1968} p. 682.

"An End of Ideology?"

Cambridge:

Commonweal'.

Harvard

8 ("March
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their lives are inhumane and unresponsive to their needs and aspirations.

Before the "Age of Affluence", a survey was conducted to

determine what percentage of the American population was happy. The
findings revealed that forty-three percent of the respondents were
yery happy.

In 1957 an almost identical question was asked and only

thirty-five percent reported themselves to be very happy.23 This
suggests that economic prosperity is not the only criterion of
happiness and satisfaction.

Economic development will provide mankind

with a sufficient surplus of wealth and leisure and consequently with
more time than the present for activities of the mind.
But once the body and mind "have been liberated, at least
partially, from the tyranny of the environment, they have still to be
liberated from the subtler tyrannies which society, morality and science
itself exercise over them for their own good."24
to limit human participation in control.

Science has tended

It reduces the human role to

supplying the machines with inputs and data materials.

Decision-making

is increasingly taken away from men and given over to machines and
routine processes. Technical rationality becomes a dominant orientation
of thought which tends to limit the freedom of social perception.

But

once it ceases to be the dominant orientation of human thought, the
human mind will strive for the attainment of other ideals and goals and
this may be manifested in higher political interest.
Modern societies have become like self-regulating machines and
as the system grows more and more complex, each individual is able to

23. Lane, Robert. The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence.
op. c.it., p. 878. •
•
24. Charles Madge. Society in the Mind: Elements of Social Eidos.
London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1964, p. 142.
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understand and control less and less of it. This kind of society is
bound to provoke reaction and an increased political interest and
concern because

it is

destructive. We can expect increased political

interest and concern "because these attitudes are generally related to
higher income and an improved capacity to take an interest in matters
other than immediate day-to-day breadwinning problems."25
All the writings about political developments in the postindustrial society appear to rest on the assumption that socio-economic
and political developments are moving in a deterministic unilinearcultural -specific direction whereby the future will be free of dogmatic,
inflexible, passionately held and articulated prescriptions of reality
and perceptions of the future. All these writings are reminiscent of
classical Marxism.

For Marx saw Marxism as having an independence of

existing social structures and hence an objectivity which rescued it
from the relativity of the ideological thought which he diagnosed in
his opponents. It was only in the communist future,that the social roots
of ideological thinking would be destroyed and ideology would finally
disappear. These writings are also reminiscent of the Marxist view
that the state will wither away. The predictions that were made with
respect to trends in the European Community reinforce this impression.
It was frequently assumed and stated that Europe was becoming depoliticized,
and that the great rifts that had split the continent over the past years
were disappearing.

Ideologies, it has been stated, have lost their hold.

Europe was gravitating towards a new kind of society; it was becoming a

25. Lane, Robert. The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence.
op'. cit.V p. 876.
-'
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consumer society, a classless society.

In these circumstances, a

"consensus government" would emerge and several persuasive generalizations were made. This "consensus government" would break national
barriers and dissolve national loyalties,, opening the road towards
political integration.

Lipset asserted that "The dominant structural

trend in Europe involves the final triumph of the values of the
industrial society, the end of rigid status class derivative from the
pre-industrial world."26
Aron also expressed the view that the workers are becoming
satisfied with material well-being and are inclined to support a new
European government which offers the material advantages. He states:
"Throughout Western Europe the type of society some call technical
and others scientific, has come into existence and it disputes the
system of human relations inherited from the ancien regime or from the
bourgeois property-oriented of the last century."27

However, integration

in Europe is yery unlikely to come from a shift of loyalty to a new
center because the Community will be seen as providing material benefits
to people. More than anything else, it will depend on the Community's
ability to fulfill spiritual aspirations but n °t by becoming a powerful
productive unit which will raise the standard of living. This will only
castrate the Community of its political ideals and render it incapable
of animating and inspiring the new generations.

26. S. M. Lipset. "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary
European Politics." Daedalus, 93, Winter, 1964, p. 287.
27. Raymond Aron.
p.'44..

"Old Nations, New Europe."

Daedalus, 93 (Winter 1964),
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The various theorists have seen common fears, common
interests, co-operation in economic areas and common economic
policies as the integrating force but they have overlooked or have
not stressed enough the creation of an ideology as being essential
to the integrative process.
Just as the Soviet State has not withered away, despite
Marx's predictions, so the major problems of the European Community
or any other society have not been solved to the satisfaction of the
general public.

Political and socio-economic developments, whether

in Europe or in America, have not moved in a deterministic way.
Lipset had predicted also that an increase in economic productivity
in affluent industrial societies would bring about an equitable
distribution of gratifications, material and non-material. This redistribution in turn would mitigate against hostility and tensions and
thus ideological consensus would be achieved.28

However, the age of

political consensus has not been achieved and this has created the need
for a new perspective that would explain the political cleavages that
are still persisting and even increasing in the face of affluence.29
Perhaps the age of political consensus has not come about
because advanced industrialization produces a changing stratification
system which alters older forms of political conflict and provides the
basis for the emergence of new forms. These conflicts have serious consequences for collective problem solving, and they may be so aggregated

28. Harold Wilenski. "Class, Class Consciousness and American Workers."
in Labour in Changing America. Ed. by William Hebert, New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1966, pp. 12-43.
29.
°P-

Robert Lane. The Politics of Consensus in an Age of Affluence.
ci

t . ,p . 878.
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as to produce pervasive strains. There are built-in limitations in
the trend towards a greater equality, as far as material benefits are
concerned.

If redistribution of income continues, we may reach the

point where productivity will decline and this appears to be taking
place in some countries that have attempted to redistribute income in
a more equitable manner. Workers will be less motivated to work and
consequently they will produce less.

As the income of the worker

increases, he will be motivated to substitute work for leisure. Furthermore, the new middle class that will emerge from increased economic
prosperity, instead of contributing to political consensus, will become
a potential combatant. The upper-working class and the lower-working
class will be pitted against those above them and those below them.30
On the other hand, as people become more prosperous, they take on the
known attitudes of prosperous individuals in an earlier period.

That is,

they become conservative and they will oppose any important social
change and reforms, thus producing more cleavages.

In the first case,

the two extremes, which are the result of stratification, become
potential forces for change. Those who are in the middle of the
distribution will want to consolidate their gains and will oppose any
attempts for change, thus becoming conservative; they create a force
of conservatism which reacts to the institution of any social measures
and reforms.
Perhaps programmes based on ideological postulates of nineteenthcentury socialism or liberalism have lost their appeal and many people

30. Harold Wilenski. Class, Class Consciousness and American Workers,
op. cit., pp. 12-43.
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have espoused the belief of incremental improvements and have
abandoned the instrumental conception of the state. This, however,
by no means implies that ideologies exercise no appeal or that we
have reached an age of non-ideological politics. The world has
acquired a vast amount of experience and in the light of this
experience old ideas and beliefs are reconstituted. Many of the old
assumptions have been abandoned, such as the faith in the common man
and his powers to understand complex problems, as well as many of the
rationalistic assumptions.
The conservatives have abandoned the notion that evil exists
independently of social or economic maladjustments and that we should
search for the sources of our discomforts in the defective human nature
rather than in the defective social order. Many of the reforms that
have been accepted as a compromise constitute evidence that politics
are not characterized by the attribution of absolute values to any programmes. This is mainly because liberalism and conservatism were founded
on democratic principles. The ideology of democracy is not committed
to any particular ideas but only to those processes of freely given
consent which enable human beings to determine what kind of economic
life they want.

Under a democratic system, individuals are free not

only to choose any system they prefer but also to abandon it. Democracy
is experimental in its outlook and sees many possible solutions rather
than those given by doctrinaires. Totalitarian ideologies, such as Marxism,
on the other hand, become a matter of religion. They are characterized

31. Sidney Hook. Political Power and Personal Freedom.
Collier Books, 1962, p. 167.

New York:
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by the tendency to act dogmatically without regard to circumstances.
Although we may be bereft of ideologies in the sense of
explanations of the world which serve to bring order out of chaos,
people have not ceased to look at political matters through ideological
prisms. The optimism of the "end of ideology" ideologues, like Daniel
Bell, Lipset, Shils and Brzezinski, comes only from their naive belief
that professional social scientists have developed paradigms to explain
and direct social changes and that such social scientists will be the
"technotricians" of the coming (?) post-industrial age. Alas, such
faith appears without merit, and brute nominalism makes more sense.
If social issues were directed by science and technology, the result
would be an ever-increasing loss of basic political control and social
direction.

If science and technology held sway, they would remove the

total social framework in which ends are chosen from the scope of
reflection and rational reconstruction. Technical control requires a
type of action that implies domination.

It would be synonymous with

the institutionalization of a form of domination whose political character
becomes intolerable.

Furthermore, the very concept of applying scientific

criteria in political decisions is very much ideological. As it has been
remarked, "the place of scientific thought in ideological formulations
is an empirical question that should not be begged by the assumption that
science and ideology are incompatible."32

When society enshrines the

scientific society, certainly it engages in the most fundamental kind of
ideological thinking.

32. Joseph La Palombra. Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and
Interpretation, op. cit., p. 9.
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Implicit in the discussion of the industrial society is the
notion of an ultimate movement toward a static equilibrium of the
social forces and a denial of the continued relevance of moral and
human ideas. But societies are not moving toward an ultimate static
equilibrium;

there is nothing unavoidable about the direction of

social development. Every society contains fluidity and dynamism;
it is not closed to change. People are reappraising values and goals
and are constantly exploring new conceptions of the good society and the
means which will bring about this good society.
CONCLUSION
From what has been discussed, the conclusion can be drawn that
the political writers who have argued that ideologies have ended have
misconstrued what happens to man's political interests, behavior, and
attitudes towards politics as society becomes more affluent. Several
plausible hypotheses have been exanined with respect to the attitudinal
change that may occur in the affluent society.
They also have misconstrued another trend in the so-called
knowledgeable society, a trend according to which social thought would
strive towards a search for a new objective, scientific basis for social
theory.

Consequently, radical critics who would see a need for some

more comprehensive social doctrine which would shape particular
criticisms and reforms to a clearly perceived end, which would lift us
out of the present "malaise", would disappear. But let us see what one
of the exponents of this theory, Seymour Lipset, has to say today:
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"There are more radical teachers who are openly political in the
classrooms today than, say, 15 years ago."33

This statement is based

on surveys conducted by Dr. Lipset himself and according to which
forty-five percent of today's college professors in the United States
consider themselves leftists.34

"if you take the young social scientists,

you will find that a total of maybe 20 to 25 percent are Marxists", he
says.
This dramatic surge of Marxism is bound to provoke strong
reaction from the opposite side and intense ideological debate. Not
only is the domain of ideology not shrinking, as Robert Lane asserted,
but it appears to be expanding.

The strong challenge of liberal

democracy may have yet to come. Perhaps Sartre was right when he said
that "Marxism is still yery young, almost in its infancy.

It has barely

started to develop."35
The discussions on ideology by the proponents of the decline
thesis have also overlooked or slighted the obvious preferences of the
poorer members of society for an increased degree of economic well-being
and a more equitable distribution of the society's resources. In
particular, if we reflect on the analysis of ideology that has been
offered by Lane, we can draw the following conclusions. A large segment
of the population has many grievances concerning both what the government

33.

Quoted by The National Enquirer.

34.

Ibid., p. 5.

December 19, 1978, p. 5.

35. Quoted by T. B. Bottomore. Critics of Society.
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1969, p. 127.

London:

George

- 93 -

does and what it fails to do, ranging from civil rights, to taxation,
to racial integration, to space programmes, to foreign warsj-e1©?.
Redistribution of income in a more equitable manner f'elilains a
\/ery serious issue and arouses strong sentiments.

Increased productivity

has resulted in lessening the harsh contrasts between the ridWearid poor;
but it has by no means done away with the differences, or wfthathe
strong "sentiments they arouse, in the United States or other countries.

s
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

To summarize what has been discussed so far with respect to
the analysis of the dec!ine-of-ideology thesis, we can say that the
fundamental problem associated with that perspective is the misplaced
reliance on a presumed convergence of the great ideological systems.
The problem that haunts these writers' analysis of the strength of
ideology is the consequence of their failure to view ideology as something other than rigid dogma, blind faith and "apocalyptic beliefs
that refuse to specify the costs and consequences of the changes they
envision."1

Thus, the convergence (?) of the two major ideologies,

according to the decline thesis, signifies an abandonment of such
apocalyptic beliefs, a convergence which, it is assumed, is the consequence of (a) an increase in affluence,

(b) an increase of the

strength of the politics of democratic socialism and

(c) the victory

of science and the application of scientific criteria in political
decisions. This concept has placed the emphasis on knowledge, technology and rationality.

According to it, a society will emerge in which

the governing of man is replaced by the administration of things.
The concept of science and rationality in the application of
politics has an old and respectable intellectual history and has a strong
ideological connotation.

It was developed in the nineteenth century as

a result of man's efforts to transcend the conflicts and irrationalities

1.

Daniel Bell. The End of Ideology, op. cit.
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of power.

It was believed that a society should be constituted in a

manner that would be consistent with the principles of science. The
theoretical foundations of Social Democracy are based on science. Social
Democrats were declaring that in striving to attain their aims and
goals, they were following the principles of science. The formulation
of any theories which aimed at solving social problems should be based
on objective proof.

If the methods employed to solve social problems

were not capable of such proof, it was no longer science but it was
resting on subjective impulses, on mere desire or opinion.^ The concept
has been revived today as similar efforts are being made by socialist
or non-socialist intellectuals to prescribe such a society.

In the West,

intellectuals are making serious efforts to develop the theory that
industrialization will achieve this goal.

Bell believes that politics

will be insulated from socio-economic change and will reflect its own
dynamic.

Such ideas are reminiscent of Marx's theory according to which

scientific understanding is objective and free from the distortions he
reserved for legal, political, and social theories.
The concept is not only ideological in the sense that it prescribes a particular form of social organization, but it is ideological
in the sense that it has been the subject of intense controversy and has
been criticized for the moral consequences it entails. Habermas has
argued that science and technology have become a form of ideology, a
distortion of reality, which serve vested interests and prevailing

2. E. Bernstein. Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Affirmation.
Translated by Edith C. Harvey, New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1909, p. 1.
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institutions.

In other words, science has itself become a social

institution which no longer serves the interests of man but instead
makes man its servant, enslaving his critical faculties, perpetuating
the existing state of affairs.
According to Habermas, when science attains a monopoly in the
guidance of human action, all relations to life will be blocked out
under the slogan of neutrality or value freedom.3

According to the

criteria of technological rationality, agreement on a collective value
system can never be achieved by means of technological discussion
carried on in public politics, by a way of a consensus rationally
arrived at. A society that integrates science within it as a productive
force only insulates itself from critical insight. The danger of an
exclusively technical civilization should be clearly grasped;

it is

threatened by the splitting of its consciousness, and by the splitting
of human beings into two classes—the social engineer and the inmates
of closed institutions.^
Marcuse has followed a similar line of criticism.

He argues

that technology provides the great rationalization of the unfreedom of
man and demonstrates the technical impossibility of being autonomous, of
determining one's life. Technological rationality protects rather than
cancels the legitimacy of domination and the instrumentalist horizon
of reason opens on rationally totalitarian society.5

3. Jurgen Habermas. Theory and Practice. Translated by John Viertel.
Boston: Beacon Press, 1973, p. 271.
4.

Ibid., p. 282.

5. Herbert Marcuse.
1960, p. 376.

Reason and Revolution.

Boston:

Beacon Press,
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The arguments that the two systems are converging have been
presented very lightly by the political theorists who have expounded
the decline-of-ideology thesis. These arguments do not provide any
evidence that ideology is declining.

Even if we assume that the West

and East are modifying their positions on certain issues, it would not
mean that issues are not seen through ideological prisms, that individuals have ceased to be motivated by ideologies or that societies have
abandoned values and principles.

If, on the other hand, a departure

from nineteenth-century ideological orientations is taken to constitute
evidence that ideologies have declined, the exponents of the decline
thesis are committing a serious error. This cannot provide the basis
for an argument that ideologies have lost their relevance. Conservatism,
for example, has taken a dual path.

It has taken the form of modern

conservatism and remained within the mainstream of liberal democracy.
If intellectuals today made any efforts to propagate conservative ideas
based on eighteenth-century postulates their efforts would be doomed to
failure.

Liberalism, too, has followed different paths. In modern

history it has been concerned about, and has been pressing for, the goals
of greater freedom, social equality, and more meaningful democracy.
The same goals, however, have been espoused by socialists although they
believe that these goals can only be attained within a different institutional framework. Thus, the liberals today are more concerned with
preserving and successfully defending those institutions which already
exist rather than creating more liberal institutions. Liberalism has
taken a conservative attitude. Liberals are reluctant to expound the
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philosophy of liberalism because this would give their enemies a
weapon with which to attack the society of liberalism.6

This attitude

is reflected in their refusal to institute comprehensive social policies,
to reform existing institutions, and to press for greater freedom. To
argue, then, that liberals are modifying their ideological positions to
the point where we can speak of convergence of the positions of Marxism
and liberalism is very absurd.
Not only can we not speak meaningfully of convergence of Marxism
and liberalism, but we cannot speak of the disappearance of radicalism
and radical movements in the West. The Communist Party has a mass base
in Italy, France, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Germany, although in
Germany it is suppressed.

In the United States there is a significant

number of radicals but their cause has not been espoused by any political
party. The reason for this is mainly the fact that an opposition party
to the existing political parties cannot exist because of reasons such
as election laws, the existence of plurality of groups which serve as a
cushion to absorb disruptive conflict and divide the focus of individuals.
Also, there has always been the "foreign threat" which has been used
to discredit any communist movements.
I have also considered the argument that high and widespread
levels of economic well-being and affluence lead to a decline in the
strength of ideologies because they lead to the creation of a society
that is non-political. But this argument suffers from many weaknesses

6. Max Bel off. Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process.
Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1955, pp. 5-7.
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and fails to provide any evidence which would support it.

Economic

development and economic progress, which is the consequence of
industrialization, will produce serious cleavages. Some social
classes will gain in social status and economic positions, whether
these gains will be relative or absolute, and others will lose in status
and economic positions, either relatively or absolutely.

This will

sharpen the sense of injustice among the public and intensify demands
for a more equitable distribution of resources.
Another consequence, which will result from increased economic
prosperity, is that as economic issues are becoming less important,
as man becomes less preoccupied with economic problems, his attention
will be released for other submerged issues and conflicts, such as
human rights, foreign and military policies, ethnic issues, etc.
In summary, it can be stated that the Marxist view of ideology
underlies the thinking of most of the exponents of the decline thesis.
However, they have gone beyond Marx in extending the pejorative
connotations of the term, such as fanaticism, chiliastic optimism,
radicalism, etc. The atrocities committed by the Nazi regime and, in
general, the disastrous consequences of the Second World War made many
realize that ideologies tended to split the world into hostile camps and
they hastened to denounce ideologies. They committed the error, however,
of judging all ideologies en bloc and not in the light of their own
respective practices and envisageable consequences. Thus, the discussion
of ideologies was altered from one of analysis to that of a concern for
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their effects. Many of the political theorists, specifically Bell,
concluded that the power of ideology lies in its ability to generate
passion. This is evidenct when Bell says that those who speak of the
end of ideology mainly mean to reject the kind of commitment which had
such a disastrous effect on the thought and policies of the radical
movements of the past two generations.^ Thus Bell thought that this
kind of passion had diminished during the 1950s and hence he proclaimed
the end of ideology. At the same time he was expressing the hope that
ideologies would be replaced by the objectivity of social science
without taking into consideration the possibility that social sciences
could be "politicized", that ideologies could influence the social
sciences.

Marx thought that the repository of objectivity was the

proletariat. Bell and others thought that social scientists were the
repository of objectivity.
It can be further stated that the exponents of the decline
thesis have confused the exhaustion of ideologies for the radical
intellectuals with the obsolescence and disutility of ideologies as
instruments for the creation of the Utopian society.
The end of ideology occurs only within two 'jery narrow circles:
the new intelligentsia of bureaucrats and social scientists and the disillusioned and exhausted ex-militants of the Left. Having lost faith
in miraculous changes, these intellectuals espoused the principles of
Social Democracy. Also, since they lost faith that ideologies can be

7. Daniel Bell and David Aiken.
38 , (October "196"4), pp.~ 69-76.

"Ideology-A Debate". Commentary,
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employed as vehicles for the formation and guidance of social
behavior, they replaced the role of ideology with science and
technology in ordering human attitudes. Thus the decline-ofideology thesis becomes more of an ideology rather than serious
social science.
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Capitalism:

Under Capitalism the economy i s organized i n a
manner i n which the means of production are p r i v a t e l y
owned. In a d d i t i o n to the private ownership o f the
means o f production, there are the f o l l o w i n g elements:
(1) a multitude o f competing producers,
(2) no government interference i n the economy,
(3) the market i s the regulator of the competition,
(4) no r e s p o n s i b i l i t y by the s t a t e f o r the people's
economic w e l f a r e .

Communism:

Communism is the name appropriated by Marx to his
own very different kind of socialism. He chose the
word Communism to distinguish his "scientific"
socialism from "Utopian" socialism of earlier theorists.
In a narrower use, "Communism" is that state of
affairs which will prevail when the Marxist scheme is
accomplished with the principle of "from each according
to his abilities, to each according to his needs".

Consensus:

The notion t h a t people and parties are i d e o l o g i c a l l y
close to one another on basic issues. A far-reaching
agreement on p o l i t i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e s and the adoption
by people and parties of s i m i l a r standpoints on
social and p o l i t i c a l ends, according to the exponents
of the decline-of-ideology t h e s i s , s i g n i f i e s a r e t r e a t
from ideology.

Conservatism:

A human attitude or a predisposition to resist change
which was turned into a political doctrine because of
challenges that developed in recent Western history,
These challenges resulted from the growing fashion for
proposing radical changes in society by deliberate
design and manipulation, The main argument put forward by the Conservatives was that men bore a heavy
responsibility to preserve much of the past for generations to come.

Convergence Theory:

The theory t h a t has been expounded by some o f the
proponents of the decline-of-ideology thesis t h a t
the socio-economic systems o f the East and West were
becoming more s i m i l a r and gradually would converge.
The theory was used i n support of the argument t h a t
ideologies were d e c l i n i n g .
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Democratic
Socialism:

Democractic Socialism accepts the value of the
parliamentary approach to power and r e j e c t s the
Marxist b e l i e f i n the i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f the collapse
of Capitalism as a r e s u l t o f i t s supposed inherent
tendency to concentrate economic.power with i t s
consequent impoverishment of the workers. On the
other hand, i t r e j e c t s the c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l idea
t h a t the general good flows from i n d i v i d u a l compet i t i o n . I t advocates an economy t h a t i s often
planned although i t does not advocate the complete
a b o l i t i o n o f p r i v a t e property.

False
Consciousness:

False consciousness, according to Marx, i s the notion
that human thought is the d i s t o r t e d r e f l e c t i o n o f
r e a l i t y . The understanding o f r e a l i t y i s d e f i c i e n t
and needs to be remedied by persuasion i f possible
and by coercion i f necessary.

Keynesian:

According to Lord Keynes, the f a i t h i n laissez f a i r e
was vanishing and society was growing more doubtful
of the wisdom o f the o l d economic ideas because o f
the serious breakdown o f economic l i f e during the
Depression. Democratic S o c i a l i s t s are i n agreement
w i t h Lord Keynes i n his b e l i e f t h a t the s t a t e ought to,
and is able t o , formulate p o l i c i e s t h a t serve the
community rather than one p a r t i c u l a r class or group.

Leninism:

Lenin formulated c e r t a i n t h e o r e t i c a l propositions
according to which: revolutionary action must always
be based on a doctrine which can be s c i e n t i f i c a l l y
determined; the working class by i t s e l f cannot
achieve s u f f i c i e n t social consciousness to carry out
i t s h i s t o r i c task o f social r e v o l u t i o n ; spontaneous
action by the workers can only lead to defeat of the
r e v o l u t i o n . The r e v o l u t i o n must be organized by
professional r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s o f both p r o l e t a r i a n and
intellectual origin.

Liberalism:

Liberalism can be understood as an economic and
p o l i t i c a l system which rests on the idea o f l i b e r t y
which i s to be understood almost wholly i n terms o f
freedom from s t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e i n the actions o f an
i n d i v i d u a l . I t also means p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n government,
rather thanbeing l e f t alone by the government.

-noMannheim's
Paradox:

According t o Mannheim, a l l knowledge i s
r e l a t i o n a l ; and hence knowledge i t s e l f i s to be
understood i n terms o f the r e l a t i o n of the possessor to the p a r t i c u l a r h i s t o r i c a l and social
context in which he i s t h i n k i n g . But the paradox
a r i s e s : what i s the status of the theory t h a t
claims t h a t a l l such knowledge i s r e l a t i v e ? The
paradox i s resolved by modern social theory because
the social s c i e n t i s t now can probe any aspect o f
human organization as dispassionately as physical
science observes chemical r e a c t i o n s .

Marxism:

The philosophical ideas expounded by Marx which
attempted to provide i n s i g h t s i n t o the working of
h i s t o r y and society t h a t transcend a p a r t i c u l a r
period. Marxism represents an especially powerful
blend o f general propositions about man and s o c i e t y ,
a pungent c r i t i c i s m o f the society of i t s t i m e , the
advocacy o f p o l i c i e s of radical change, and a view
of a m i l l e n n i a l w o r l d .

Peaceful
Co-existence:

Refers t o the condition o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s
i n which states w i t h d i s s i m i l a r social systems and
antagonistic ideologies l i v e side by side without
f i g h t i n g . While "peace" normally implies some
measure of p o s i t i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation,
"co-existence" may mean l i t t l e more than that the
states concerned r e f r a i n from war.

Pragmatism:

A theory of truth that holds that an idea is true
if it works satisfactorily; that is, if it leads
to an anticipated experience. It has been used by
political scientists to distinguish the "objective
society" from the ideological society. According to
these theorists, the pragmatic society is the opposite
of the ideological society.

Socialism:

Socialism and Communism are used by noncommunists in
a radically different sense. Socialism is understood
to involve a moderately planned economy (with some
nationalization of industry) under a democratic
government. According to this distinction many
European parties are socialist - that is, they
ascribe to social democracy - and the Soviet Union
and China are communist.

-111Stalinism:

Insofar as theory i s concerned, what can be
said i s t h a t S t a l i n l a i d greater emphasis than
Lenin ever did on the p o s s i b i l i t y o f achieving
" s o c i a l i s m " i n one country. Since 1956, the
term " S t a l i n i s m " has been used by exponents o f
communism i n the Soviet Union to designate abuses
o f Leninism which S t a l i n p r a c t i c e d .

Technology:

For the exponents o f the d e c l i n e - o f - i d e o l o g y
t h e s i s , technology w i l l come to shrink the domain
o f ideology because decisions w i l l be determined
by the s c i e n t i f i c c r i t e r i a as well as technologi c a l c r i t e r i a . The c r i t i c a l r o l e i n the economy
and p o l i t i c s w i l l be played by technical workers
and the r o l e of p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s w i l l diminish.

Totalitarianism:

Total rule which allows j u s t one p a r t y . I t i s based
upon a s i n g l e party which retains i t s name from the
time i t was f i g h t i n g f o r power. The party remains a
m i n o r i t y , c o n t r o l l i n g and purging i t s e l f . The rule
o f the party knows no legal o p p o s i t i o n , only
opponents who must be " l i q u i d a t e d " because they are
i l l - n a t u r e d or i l l - d i s p o s e d .

Welfare State:

The welfare state has f a i r l y e x p l i c i t commitments to
the broad goals o f economic development; f u l l
employment; e q u a l i t y of opportunity f o r the young;
social s e c u r i t y ; protected minimum standards as
regards income, housing, h e a l t h , and education f o r
a l l regions and social groups.

